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In the spring of 2004, Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton
traveled to Portland, Oregon, for an Earth Day press event at the
Oregon Zoo where she “announced” a deal to preserve 23,000
acres of native grasslands near Boardman, in Eastern Oregon.1
Norton announced that under the deal, a section of the country’s
largest dairy farm would be set aside for conservation of four
rare prairie species.2
Under this agreement, “Threemile Canyon Farm, owned by
R.D. Offutt Co., the Fargo, N.D. agricultural-development giant
and world’s largest potato producer, is paying the Nature Con-
servancy $130,000 annually to monitor the protected land.”3  This
will “protect the burrowing Washington ground squirrel, which
has lost most of its sage brush and clump grass habitat to agricul-
ture,”4 causing it to be listed as endangered under Oregon law5
1 Andrew Kramer, Associated Press, Interior Secretary Announces Deal for
Boardman Dairy , DEMOCRAT-HERALD (Albany, Or.), Apr. 25, 2004, at A4; Press
Release, WaterWatch Oregon, Conservationists Blast Gale Norton’s Endangered
Species “Green Wash,” (Apr. 24, 2004), available at  http://www.waterwatch.org/
Press/Releases/Norton%20%204-24-04.htm.
2 Kramer, supra  note 1.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See OREGON DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, OREGON THREATENED AND ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES LIST, available at  http://www.dfw.state.or.us/wildlife/diversity/
threatened_endangered.asp.
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and to become a candidate for listing under the federal Endan-
gered Species Act6 (ESA).
The ground squirrel “inhabits a sliver of prairie on the now
mostly plowed-under, but once-vast, Boardman Grasslands, a
rolling plain east of the Cascade Mountains previously domi-
nated by antelopes and wolves and dotted with sage and clump
grasses.”7  Norton called the agreement “the wave of the future
and a model of private and public cooperation” for its protection
of property owners from future liability in exchange for conces-
sions to set aside habitat if a candidate species on their property
is listed as endangered.8  Norton said, “‘The agreement serves as
a model of how the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service can work with
states, local communities and private partners to enhance the
habitat for and protection of endangered species.’”9
In reality, however, the foundation of the deal was laid four
years earlier when Offutt agreed to settle legal challenges
brought by environmental groups.10  Offutt wanted to develop
the property, once a rocket-engine testing area for the Boeing
Co., into a massive farm, but made the concessions Norton dis-
cussed at the press event, in response to the hard work of conser-
vation groups and protections afforded by the ESA.11
In response to the press event, WaterWatch said it was ironic
that Norton praised the agreement made possible by the Act, be-
cause the Bush administration had opposed listing additional
species.12
The contradictions arising out of Norton’s speech on the Wash-
ington ground squirrel lie at the center of a much larger debate
over the future of livestock grazing on federal lands in the West.
On one side of this issue, many livestock interests, government
land-managers, and scientists maintain that grazing is not only
compatible with protection of western rangelands but actually
improves ecosystems and wildlife habitat.  According to grazing
6 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES SYS-
TEM (TESS) (2006), available at  http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/SpeciesReport.do?
listingType=C (naming species that are candidates for listing). The ESA is found at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
7 Kramer, supra  note 1.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 See id. ; see also  Craig Scott, Water Watch Suit Partially Resolved , EAST OREGO-
NIAN (Pendleton, Or.), Sept. 9, 2000, at 3A (providing background on the lawsuit).
11 Kramer, supra  note 1.
12 Press Release, WaterWatch Oregon, supra note 1.
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advocates, for example, a scientific panel set up in 1994 by the
National Academy of Sciences “reported it was not possible to
determine if the range was stable, deteriorating or improving”
because “[t]he studies do not exist.”13
In addition, recent studies in peer-reviewed journals such as
BioScience , Conservation Biology , and Environmental Science
and Policy  conclude that cattle ranches are often “crucial puzzle
pieces holding together an increasingly fragmented landscape.”14
According to such studies, when ranches are sold and subse-
quently subdivided into “ranchettes” of forty acres or less for res-
idential purposes, “invasive species move in along with people
and their pets, and fewer native species can live on the land.”15
In addition, a study conducted by Colorado State University in
Fort Collins found that ranches have at least as many species of
birds, carnivores, and plants as similar areas protected as wildlife
refuges, and that ranches provide a better habitat for wildlife
than ranchettes, which have fewer native and more invasive
species.16
On the other hand, repeated scientific studies have illustrated
the devastating effects that livestock grazing can have on listed
species.17  As a result, many conservationists maintain that graz-
ing supporters are missing the point by comparing current re-
duced stocking-rates and/or newer grazing systems with older,
more destructive techniques.  Conservationists also contend that
grazing supporters simply fail to acknowledge that the best
means of recovery for rangelands is to remove livestock perma-
nently or severely reduce their numbers for degraded areas.18
As with many environmental controversies, this debate has
found its way into federal court opinions representing the range
13 Ed Marston, Cow-Free Crowd Ignores Science Sprawl , HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Dec. 9, 2002, at 6.
14 Jon Christensen, Conservationists See Room for Grazing on the Landscape , OR-
EGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Sept. 15, 2002, at A19.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 For example, in 1994, the Forest Service reported that livestock grazing was a
major cause of species endangerment in the United States. CURTIS H. FLATHER ET
AL., U.S. FOREST SERV., SPECIES ENDANGERMENT PATTERNS IN THE UNITED
STATES 12, 22-23 (1994).
18 See, e.g. , Joy Belsky et al., What the River Once Was, Livestock Destruction of
Waters and Wetlands , in GEORGE WUERTHNER & MOLLIE MATTESON, WELFARE
RANCHING, THE SUBSIDIZED DESTRUCTION OF THE AMERICAN WEST 179, 179-80
(2002).
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of scientific and legal interpretations, including the application of
the ESA to riparian-habitat grazing practices.  Congress’ recent
scrutiny of the ESA highlights the significant role the contro-
versy over livestock grazing on public lands has played in the fu-
ture of the Act and federal rangeland-management practices.19
This Article examines the successes and failures of applying
the ESA and related laws and policies in protecting federal
rangelands from abusive livestock grazing, as well as the conse-
quences the controversy may pose for the ESA and public-lands
grazing itself.  Specifically, this Article discusses (1) a summary
of the legal and scientific standards affecting rangeland and ripa-
rian resources; (2) ESA standards and procedures; (3) ESA liti-
gation; (4) on-the-ground examples of ESA species and habitat
protection; (5) application of the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) to ESA riparian-grazing cases, including final actions,
parties, standing, and ripeness; and (6) the future of the ESA and
current legislative efforts to gut the Act.  The Article concludes
by assessing how attacks on the Act may actually lead to reforms
of livestock grazing on federal lands.
I
LAW AND SCIENCE ON THE RANGE
Whether the ESA and other laws require federal agencies to
exclude grazing from riparian areas in order to protect the
unique and fragile characteristics of river habitats is a fundamen-
tal component of the controversy over grazing on publicly owned
rangeland.  The ESA is most often wielded by conservationists
attempting to protect riparian areas from abuse.  These areas are
typically narrow strips of green growth found on either side of
streams and rivers that wind through vast areas of desert, prairie,
and forest landscapes throughout the West.
Teeming with life (compared to the often-harsh surrounding
desert environments), experts believe that “the riparian/stream
ecosystem is the single most productive type of wildlife habitat,
19 See  Brodie Farquhar, Pombo Takes on the Endangered Species Act , HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Oct. 17, 2005, at 3 (discussing the House of Representatives’ recent
approval of Representative Pombo’s Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery
Act, which called for the elimination of “critical habitat,” among other controversial
changes).
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benefiting the greatest number of species.”20  Riparian zones
provide a classic example of what scientists call “the ecological
principals of edge effect.”21  Such areas provide “living condi-
tions for a greater variety of wildlife than any other types of
habitat found in California, the Great Basin of southeast Oregon,
the Southwest, the Great Plains, and perhaps the entire North
American continent,”22 and are “the most productive and possi-
bly the most sensitive of North American habitats and should be
managed accordingly.”23
Riparian vegetation is also a critical element in the protection
of anadromous and resident fish species because it “provides
shade, preventing adverse water temperature fluctuations.”24
The roots of “trees, shrubs, and herbaceous vegetation stabilize
streambanks, providing cover in the form of overhanging banks,”
and “[s]treamside vegetation acts as a ‘filter’ to prevent sediment
debris from man’s activities from entering the stream.”25  Finally,
riparian vegetation affects “the food chain of the ecosystem by
shading the stream and providing organic detritus and insects for
the stream organisms.”26
Although the existence and quality of streamside vegetation
indirectly affects the quality of habitat for anadromous and resi-
dent coldwater fish,27 and it is generally accepted that livestock
grazing has been a key factor in the substantial degradation of
western riparian areas since the early 1900s,28 the desire to pro-
tect these areas frequently conflicts with their use for livestock
grazing and other commodity production.  More importantly,
federal courts routinely require more than just the significance of
riparian areas for ecological sustainability to enforce protection
standards.  Judicial decisions related to livestock grazing, there-
fore, usually turn on the data and scientific literature.
20 J. Boone Kauffman & W.C. Krueger, Livestock Impacts on Riparian Ecosys-
tems and Streamside Management Implications . . . A Review , 37 J. RANGE MGMT.
430, 431 (1984).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 J. Boone Kauffman et al., Effects of Late Season Cattle Grazing on Riparian
Plant Communities , 36 J. RANGE MGMT. 685, 685 (1983).
24 Kauffman & Krueger, supra  note 20, at 431. R
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See  A.J. Belskey et al., Survey of Livestock Influences on Stream and Riparian
Ecosystems in the Western United States , 54 J. SOIL & WATER CONS. 419, 419 (1999).
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II
ESA STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
Several legal theories potentially apply once a claimant chal-
lenges a grazing action under the ESA in either an administrative
or judicial forum; they are summarized in the following sections.
A. Listing Species
To determine whether a species warrants listing as “endan-
gered”29 or “threatened”30 under the ESA, the Secretary of the
Interior or Commerce must consider (1) the present or
threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat
or range; (2) over-utilization for commercial, recreational, scien-
tific, or educational purposes; (3) disease or predation; (4) the
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (5) other natu-
ral or manmade factors affecting its continued existence.31  Fed-
eral courts interpret this criteria rather strictly.  Listing agencies,
for example, may not consider proposed or future regulatory
mechanisms as a basis for not listing a species,32 and listing deci-
sions may be made solely on the basis of the best scientific and
commercial data available.33
Any “interested person” may request that a species be listed
by filing a petition34 that initiates rule-making procedures under
the federal Administrative Procedure Act.35  The petition must
include (1) the action sought, (2) the species’ common and scien-
tific names, (3) a narrative description of why the action is
needed, (4) a description of the species’ status throughout a sig-
nificant portion of its range, and (5) scientific documentation
29 An “endangered” species is “in danger of extinction throughout all or a signifi-
cant portion of its range.”  Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2006).
30 A “threatened” species “is likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” Id.
§ 1532(20).
31 Id. § 1533(a)(1); see also  David E. Filippi & Greg D. Corbin, Federal and Ore-
gon Endangered Species Acts , in ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW, OR. ST. B. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 43-3 to -4 (Donald H. Pyle et al. eds.,
2006).
32 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-5 (citing Or. Natural Res. Council v. R
Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1152 (D. Or. 1998)).
33 Id.  (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A)).
34 Id.  (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A)).
35 Id.  at 43-6 (citing Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (2006)).  Section 553 of the APA spe-
cifically addresses notice and comment rulemaking.
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supporting the petition.36  Once the petition is filed, the Secre-
tary has ninety days to determine whether it “presents substantial
scientific or commercial information” indicating that listing may
be appropriate.37
If listing may be appropriate, the Secretary has twelve months
from the petition’s filing to determine whether the action in
question is not warranted,38 is warranted,39 or is warranted but
precluded by the listing agency’s need to process other pending
petitions.40  Preclusion is appropriate as long as the agency is
making expeditious progress toward action on other petitions.41
A finding that the petition action is not warranted is a final
agency action subject to judicial review, as is a finding that the
action is warranted but precluded.42  If the agency is unable to
make a determination as to whether the action is warranted, it
has another twelve months to revisit the issue and make such
determination.43
After determining that an action is warranted, the Secretary
must publish a notice in the Federal Register and provide a sixty-
day public-comment period.44  Such comment period may be ex-
tended for “good cause.”45  The notice must include a summary
of the data the agency used in reaching its decision, an analysis
linking the data to the proposed rule, and a summary of the fac-
tors affecting the species.46  Within twelve months of publication,
the agency must make a decision on the proposed listing.47  Spe-
cifically, it must publish the final rule, withdraw the proposed
rule if the evidence does not justify the proposed action, or ex-
tend the deadline for no more than six months when substantial
36 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-6 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b)(2)(i)-(iv) R
(2006)).
37 Id.  (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A)).  A decision that the action requested
is not warranted is considered final agency action subject to judicial review under
the APA. See id.  (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(ii)).
38 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(i).
39 Id.  § 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii).
40 Id.  § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii).
41 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-7 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii)). R
42 See id.  (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(ii)).
43 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(D)(ii).
44 Filippi & Corbin, supra note 31, at 43-7 (citing 16 U.S.C. § (b)(5)(A)(i)).
45 Id.  (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 424.16(c)(2) (2006)).
46 Id.  (citing 50 C.F.R. § 424.16(b)).
47 Id.  (citing 50 C.F.R. § 424.17(a)(1)).
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disagreement exists over the sufficiency or accuracy of the infor-
mation relied upon by the agency.48
The Ninth Circuit recently concluded that the time limit for
making initial listing determinations under 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(3)(A) cannot be interpreted independently of the one-
year limitation imposed for final determination under subsection
(b)(3)(B).49  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) argued
in Badgley  that the subsection (b)(3)(A) requirement of initial
listing determinations within ninety days “[t]o the maximum ex-
tent practicable” means if it is not practicable to complete the
determination within such time, the finding may be delayed in-
definitely.50  The court held, however, that “[t]he Service’s inter-
pretation would render subsection (b)(3)(B) inoperative,” and
found that “[t]he only way to give effect to both  deadline provi-
sions is to apply the twelve-month deadline to both the initial
and final determinations.”51  The court reasoned that “[i]f the fi-
nal determination must be made within twelve months, the only
logical conclusion is that the initial one must be made within that
time as well.”52
An important basis for the court’s decision was that the Ser-
vice’s allegedly wrongful delay was “capable of repetition yet
evading review” because, in listing determination cases, once liti-
gation is filed to compel the agency to make a decision, “disputes
are routinely too short in duration to receive full judicial re-
view.”53  In addition, the plaintiffs’ litigation history with the
USFWS and pending petitions filed indicated they would litigate
the extent of the agency’s discretion to delay making a twelve-
month finding, thereby fulfilling the second requirement of the
repetition/evasion exception to the mootness doctrine.54
48 Id.  (citing 50 C.F.R. § 424.17(a)(1)); see also  Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d
867, 871 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the duty to publish or withdraw the rule within
the twelve- or eighteen-month time frame is mandatory and not subject to agency
discretion); Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-7 to -8 (discussing Babbitt  and R
additional case law related to this issue).
49 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31 at 43-3 (2006 Supp.) (citing Biodiversity Legal R
Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2002)).
50 Badgley , 309 F.3d at 1175.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.  at 1774.
54 Id.
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B. Critical Habitat
At the same time a species is listed, the listing agency must, “to
the maximum extent prudent and determinable,” and based on
the “best scientific data available,” designate critical habitat.55
“Critical habitat” means specific habitat consisting of physical or
biological features that are essential to the conservation of the
species and may require special management considerations, and
that is either within the species’ geographical area at the time the
species is listed, or outside such geographical area if the Secre-
tary determines it is appropriate.56
Unlike listing decisions, critical-habitat determinations must
address “the economic impact . . . and any other relevant impact”
of such measures.57  Recent actions by the Bush administration
have significantly affected the federal government’s ability to en-
force protection of critical habitat under ESA regulations.  Spe-
cifically, while regulatory rule adjustments, required by recent
court decisions mandating much more specific analysis of eco-
nomic impacts, were being made through the public rule-making
process, the administration abandoned a federal policy of main-
taining critical-habitat protection for nineteen salmon and steel-
head species located on the West Coast through a legal
settlement with development interests.58  The settlement
removes critical-habitat protection now enjoyed by such species
in “150 watersheds, river segments, bays and estuaries in Wash-
ington, Oregon, California and Idaho.”59
By agreeing to repeat the economic analysis when there is
nothing wrong with the first one, the administration’s actions
may create a dangerous precedent.  This aggressive approach to
overturning critical-habitat designations has wide-ranging impli-
cations not only for the species involved in the settlement, but for
many other listed species as well.
C. Section 7 Consultation
Section 7 of the ESA requires all federal agencies,
55 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-9 (citing Endangered Species Act, 16 R
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A), (b)(2) (2006)).
56 Id.  (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)).
57 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
58 Cat Lazaroff, Some Salmon Stand to Lose Habitat Protection , ENVT. NEWS.
SERV., Mar. 12, 2002, available at  http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/mar2002/2002-
03-11-07.asp.
59 Id.
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in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary,
[to] insure that any action authorized, funded or carried out by
such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of any endangered species or threatened species or re-
sult in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of
such species.60
To assist federal agencies in complying with this mandate, they
must consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA
Fisheries) or the USFWS (the consulting agency) whenever their
actions may affect a listed anadromous species.61
1. The Consultation Process
Whenever a federal agency’s activities are discretionary, it
must “review its actions at the earliest possible time” to deter-
mine whether they are likely to jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of a listed species or adversely modify critical habitat.62  If
the agency determines that the proposed action “may affect” a
listed species, it must formally consult with the USFWS and/or
the NOAA Fisheries, depending on the species affected.63
To determine whether consultation is required, “the first step
is to find out whether listed species or critical habitat are present
in the action area.”64  In the case of major construction activities,
the action agency must  request assistance from the consulting
agency unless it is already aware of whether listed species or criti-
cal habitat are present.65  “Major construction activity” means a
construction activity or other undertaking with similar physical
impact that would be characterized as “a major Federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” re-
60 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-14 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). R
61 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3).
62 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-15 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (2006)); R
USFWS & NOAA FISHERIES, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT CONSULTATION HAND-
BOOK: PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING SECTION 7 CONSULTATIONS AND CONFER-
ENCES, at 4-1 (1998), available at  http://www.fws.gov/Endangered/consultations/
s7hndbk/ch4.pdf [hereinafter CONSULTATION HANDBOOK].  See infra  Part II(C)(5)
for a discussion on “Incidental Take.”
63 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-15 to -16 (citing Natural Res. Def. Coun- R
cil v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 526 U.S. 1111
(1999)).
64 Id.  at 43-16 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(c)).
65 Id.  (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(c)).
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quiring the production of an Environmental Impact Statement
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).66
To this end,
[t]he Federal agency or the designated non-Federal represen-
tative shall convey to the Director either (1) a written request
for a list of any listed or proposed species or designated or
proposed critical habitat that may be present in the action
area; or (2) a written notification of the species and critical
habitat that are being included in the biological assessment.67
If such species or habitat are present and if the proposed action is
“likely to adversely affect listed species or critical habitat,” the
agency usually must enter into formal consultation68 and must
prepare a biological assessment to assist in making the determi-
nation.69  Any conclusion regarding impacts to listed species or
critical habitat may only be reached as a result of the preparation
of a biological assessment under section 402.12 or as a result of
informal consultation with the appropriate service under section
402.13 “with the written concurrence of the Director.”70
For actions that “may affect” listed species or critical habitat
but are not major construction activities, however, the action
agency may independently analyze the effects of the action or
initiate an informal consultation with the appropriate fish agency
in lieu of preparing a biological assessment.71  In such cases, if
the agency determines that the action will have no effect, it may
terminate consultation.72
Unlike formal consultation, informal consultation is voluntary
and generally determines whether a formal process is required
through discussion and correspondence between the action
agency and the FWS or NOAA Fisheries.73  During informal
66 Id.  (citing National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)
(2006) (requiring a statement of environmental impact (quoting 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.02)).
67 50 C.F.R. § 402.12.
68 See  50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a)-(b).
69 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-17 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(k)).  The R
failure to conduct a biological assessment in such cases results in a substantive viola-
tion of the ESA. Id.  (citing Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 763-65 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the failure to prepare biological assessment justified injunction against
Forest Service road construction project)).
70 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(b).
71 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-16. R
72 CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra  note 62, at 3-3. R
73 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-16; see also CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, R
supra  note 62, at 3-3. R
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consultation, “if the action agency concludes . . . that the action is
‘not likely to adversely affect’ listed species or critical habitat,
and the consulting agency concurs, consultation is concluded.”74
In livestock-grazing cases, “the grazing permit program pro-
duces significant impacts on individual locales.”75  Therefore, the
action agency typically issues a letter to the consulting agency
along with the biological assessment, requesting formal consulta-
tion regarding the potential effects of the proposed grazing activ-
ity on a species and its designated critical habitat.76  The letter
and/or assessment must describe (1) the action and the action
area; (2) the listed species and critical habitat present; (3) the
potential effects based on the “best scientific and commercial
data available,” including its cumulative effects; and (4) any rele-
vant reports or other information.77  A typical Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) biological assessment, for example, will
conclude that some livestock-grazing allotments “may affect,”78
and that grazing on other allotments is “[n]ot [l]ikely to
[a]dversely [a]ffect,” listed species or their habitat.79
While there are few specific standards or criteria regarding an
assessment’s content, federal courts have provided some gui-
dance.  NOAA Fisheries and USFWS regulations limit the dis-
cussion of biological assessments to the document’s uses.  First,
assessments can help determine whether a formal consultation or
a conference is required under section 402.14 or section 402.10,
respectively.  Once the biological assessment is completed, the
action agency must submit it to the agency director for review.80
If the director concurs that there are no listed species or critical
habitat present, then formal consultation is not required.81  If the
biological assessment indicates that the action is not likely to
74 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-16 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a)).  The R
agency may make such a conclusion “only if ALL of the reasonably expected effects
of the proposed action will be beneficial, insignificant, or discountable.” CONSULTA-
TION HANDBOOK, supra  note 62, at 4-1. R
75 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 834 (D.D.C. 1974).
76 See, e.g. , Letter from Harry Cosgriffe, Area Manager, Cent. Or. Res. Area,
Bureau of Land Mgmt., to Theodore Meyers, NOAA Fisheries (June 5, 2000) (on
file with author); BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PRINEVILLE DISTRICT, FINAL
BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT FOR STEELHEAD TROUT AND ITS HABITAT IN THE JOHN
DAY RIVER BASIN (2000) [hereinafter 2000 BIOP, JOHN DAY RIVER BASIN].
77 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-17 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(c)). R
78 See, e.g. , Cosgriffe, supra  note 76. R
79 2000 BIOP, JOHN DAY RIVER BASIN, supra  note 76, at F4. R
80 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(j).
81 See id.  § 402.12(k)(1).
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jeopardize the continued existence of proposed species or result
in the destruction or adverse modification of proposed critical
habitat, and the director concurs, then a conference is not
required.82
The regulations also allow the director to use the results of the
biological assessment (1) to determine whether to request that
the federal agency initiate formal consultation or a conference,
(2) to formulate a biological opinion, or (3) to formulate a pre-
liminary biological opinion.83
In Forest Guardians v. United States Forest Service , the New
Mexico Federal District Court ruled that the Forest Service vio-
lated the ESA and National Forest Management Act for failing
to fully consider the effects of grazing on endangered wildlife on
the Copper Creek allotment in New Mexico’s Gila National For-
est.84  Specifically, Judge Armijo held that the Forest Service’s
practice of refusing to analyze the full impacts of ten-year grazing
permits on threatened and endangered species was a violation of
the ESA.85  The Forest Service preferred to analyze only a three-
year term, a period much less likely to show the long-term ad-
verse environmental impacts of grazing.86
The USFWS or NOAA Fisheries is required to conclude for-
mal consultation within ninety days of initiation,87 and, when an
applicant is involved, consultation cannot be extended for more
than sixty days without the applicant’s consent.88  Within forty-
five days of completing consultation, the consulting agency must
issue a “biological opinion” (BiOp),89 which lists the agency’s
conclusions as to whether the effects of the proposed action are
82 Id.
83 Id.  § 402.12(k)(2).
84 No. 01-504, slip op. at 32, 39-40 (D.N.M. 2002).
85 Id.  at 32, 39.
86 See id.  at 32.  The court additionally concluded that the Forest Service was not
excused from compliance with the ESA or National Forest Management Act under
a 1995 federal budget law called the Rescissions Act. Id.  at 27-32; see also  Emer-
gency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for Antiter-
rorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occurred at
Oklahoma City and Rescissions Act, Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 504, 19 Stat. 194, 212-13
(1995).  Contrary to the Forest Service’s claims, the Rescissions Act merely grants an
extension of time for the completion of the analyses required by environmental laws,
not an exemption. Forest Guardians , No. 01-504, slip op. at 31-32.
87 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(e).
88 Id.
89 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 14-17 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) R
(2006); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(e)).
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“likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical
habitat.”90  In the typical livestock-grazing action, the consulting
agency may concur that some of the allotments in question “may
affect, but not likely to adversely affect,” and some are “likely to
adversely affect” listed species.91
The consulting agency must consider the “cumulative effects”
of the proposed action on the listed species or critical habitat,92
as well as including an analysis of each specific action relative to
overall implementation across a broad geographic scope.93  “‘Cu-
mulative effects’ are those effects of future state or private activi-
ties, not involving federal activities, that are reasonably certain to
occur within the action area of the federal action subject to con-
sultation.”94  In livestock-grazing actions, for example, NOAA
Fisheries may concur with the BLM’s determination that the
grazing is not likely to adversely affect listed anadromous species
because the allotments, located along the water body in question,
effect migratory habitat only.95
In Pacific Coast Federation of Fisherman’s Associations v. Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service , environmental organizations
brought an ESA action against NOAA Fisheries challenging the
Agency’s conclusions regarding proposed timber sales in spotted
owl habitat.96  NOAA Fisheries determined that the sales were
consistent with the Northwest Forest Plan for protection of Ore-
gon Coast coho salmon and Umpqua River cutthroat trout at the
90 Id.  (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(h)(3)).
91 See, e.g. , NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES
SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION, EFFECTS OF LIVESTOCK GRAZING ALLOTMENTS AD-
MINISTERED BY THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT IN THE JOHN DAY RIVER
BASIN, OREGON FOR 2000 AND 2001, at 1 (2001), available at  http://sea-
horse.nmfs.noaa.gov/pls/pcts-pub/sxn7.pcts_upload.download?p_file= F23356/
200000944_livestock_grazing_01-17-2001.pdf [hereinafter 2001 BIOP, JOHN DAY
RIVER BASIN].
92 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-17 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(3)). R
93 See  Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fisherman’s Ass’ns v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 253
F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001).
94 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.02, 402.14(g)(3).
95 See, e.g. , Letter from William Stelle, Junior Reg’l Adm’r, NOAA Fisheries, to
Harry R. Cosgriffe, Area Manager, Cent. Or. Res. Area, Bureau of Land Mgmt.
(June 28, 2000) [hereinafter NOAA Fisheries 2000 Concurrence letter] (concurring,
in regards to a Section 7 Informal Consultation on Ongoing and Proposed Actions
in the Central Oregon Resource Area, Prineville District, BLM, John Day River
Basin, that grazing allotments were not likely to adversely affect species that used
them solely for migratory purposes) (on file with author).
96 253 F.3d at 1140.
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watershed level, and that any degradation that could not be mea-
sured at the watershed level was consistent with the Plan and,
therefore, warranted a “no jeopardy” finding.97
The issue in Pacific Coast Federation  was whether in “a 128
acre project represent[ing] only 1% to 0.1% of a watershed, any
degradation would be perceptible at the watershed level . . . [and]
whether any effect was given to the cumulative degradation.”98
Rejecting the federal government’s claim, the court held, “[I]t
does not follow that [NOAA Fisheries] is free to ignore site deg-
radations because they are too small to affect the accomplish-
ment of that goal at the watershed scale.”99  In addition, the
court determined that NOAA Fisheries’ failure to account for
the cumulative impacts of individual timber sales violated federal
law.100
Significantly, in reaching its conclusion the court also stated,
“If the effects of individual projects are diluted to insignificance
and not aggregated, then [plaintiffs are] correct in asserting that
[NOAA Fisheries’] assessment of [Aquatic Conservation Strat-
egy] consistency at the watershed level is tantamount to assuming
that no project will ever lead to jeopardy of a listed species.”101
General reluctance to acknowledge localized impacts of grazing
activity was recently illustrated in a USFWS BiOp regarding
BLM management of the John Day Wild and Scenic River in
Eastern Oregon.102  The opinion concluded that livestock-grazing
activities in the planning area “are too limited in scale and scope
to affect the majority of occupied bull trout habitats and the 141
identified subpopulations within the [Distinct Population Seg-
ment],” and while “[p]roject related impacts to streambank vege-
tation and banks may occur from grazing and dispersed
recreation, [these] are likely to be localized.”103
Once it is determined that the federal land managers will au-
thorize grazing in critical habitat, if the consulting agency deter-
mines that such grazing is likely to jeopardize listed species or to
97 See id.  at 1144.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See id.  at 1145.
101 Id.
102 STATE SUPERVISOR/DEPUTY STATE SUPERVISOR, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
OR. STATE OFFICE, FORMAL CONSULTATION FOR ONGOING ACTIVITIES ON THE
NORTH FORK JOHN DAY RIVER (2001).
103 Id.  at 33.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\21-2\OEL203.txt unknown Seq: 17 30-APR-07 9:42
2006] The Future of Livestock Grazing 399
cause the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat,
it must suggest “reasonable and prudent alternatives” (RPAs) to
the federal action.104  The RPAs must not violate the Act’s prohi-
bition on jeopardizing listed species or result in the destruction
or adverse modification of habitat, and they must allow the ac-
tion agency to avoid jeopardy of the species in question.105
2. Irreversible or Irretrievable Commitment of Resources
After the action agency initiates consultation, section 7(d) of
the Act prohibits making any “irreversible or irretrievable com-
mitment of resources” that has the effect of foreclosing alterna-
tives to proposed actions.106 The Ninth Circuit states that “the
purpose of section 7(d) is to ‘maintain the status quo’ during the
consultation process.”107
According to NOAA Fisheries regulations, an action under
section 7 “means all activities or programs of any kind author-
ized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal
agencies. . . .  Examples include, but are not limited to . . . actions
directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land, water, or
air.”108 Further, all effects of the action must be considered,109
including “the direct and indirect effects of an action on the spe-
cies or critical habitat, together with the effects of other activities
that are interrelated or interdependent with that action.”110
In Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations v. U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation , for example, although the Bureau of
Reclamation initiated formal consultation, the court prohibited it
from taking action that would impact water that may have been
necessary to protect the threatened coho salmon and its critical
habitat from jeopardy.111  “[O]nce that water is diverted to other
uses, it may not be recaptured,” the court reasoned, “[n]or can
104 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A); see also  Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-18. R
105 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
106 Filippi & Corbin, supra  note 31, at 43-18 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d); 50 C.F.R. R
§ 402.09).
107 Id.  (2006) (quoting Lane County Audubon Soc’y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290, 294
(9th Cir. 1992)).
108 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
109 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d).
110 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
111 138 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1248-50 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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the effect on the coho salmon or its critical habitat be undone if
the proposed flows are too low.”112
Additionally, federal agencies retain the authority to protect
listed species from any activity that potentially impacts such spe-
cies, when such activity is discretionary, even if it involves
amending existing contracts, leases, or permits.  For example, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the United States has the power to
allocate water managed under federal reclamation projects to
meet the needs of endangered species113 and does not violate
contracts with resource-use interests by following the mandate of
the ESA and other federal laws.114  Further, the government
must amend its contracts and change standard practices when it
retains any level of discretionary authority over management of
federal actions.115
3. Violations of RPAs and Terms and Conditions
Section 7 violations may also occur if the action agency does
not carry out directives under RPAs or the “terms and condi-
tions” provided by the fish and wildlife agency.116  If NOAA
Fisheries, for example, provides as part of RPAs or terms and
conditions in a BiOp that stubble height for livestock-grazing al-
lotments must be six inches, and the land-management agency
determines in a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)
or management plan that the stubble height could be lower, then
the agency is likely in violation of section 7.
If a BiOp bases its jeopardy finding upon guidelines such as
PACFISH,117 it must analyze the project’s consistency with those
112 Id. at 1249 (citing Lane County , 958 F.2d at 295 (“[T]imber sales constitute
per se  irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources under section
7(d).”)).
113 Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 262 (9th Cir.
1984).
114 O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 689 (9th Cir. 1995).
115 Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, No. 99-1320, 2002 WL 32813602, at *17,
*20 (D.N.M. Apr. 19, 2002).
116 See  16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2006); see also id.  § 1536(b)(4)(C)(iv).  Terms
and conditions include, but are “not limited to, reporting requirements[ ] that must
be complied with by the Federal agency or applicant (if any), or both, to implement
the measures specified under [RPAs]. Id.  § 1536(b)(4)(C)(iv).
117 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE ET AL., DECISION NOTICE/DECISION RE-
CORD, FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, FOR
THE INTERIM STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING ANADROMOUS FISH-PRODUCING WA-
TERSHEDS IN EASTERN OREGON AND WASHINGTON, IDAHO, AND PORTIONS OF
CALIFORNIA (1995) [hereinafter PACFISH].  PACFISH is an interim land-manage-
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guidelines.118  As a result, an Environmental Impact Statement
affecting a livestock-grazing planning unit in the Northwest, for
example, often must include an analysis of watershed conditions
as required by NOAA fisheries.119  An FEIS in the Northwest
often must also adequately disclose the Riparian Management
Objectives for bank stability and substrate, required by NOAA
BiOps for Long Range Management Plans as amended by
PACFISH.120  Further, Northwestern NOAA Fisheries BiOps
typically require action agencies to “[c]onsistently implement
grazing-related standards and guidelines listed in PACFISH to
achieve Riparian Management Objectives regarding bank stabil-
ity, water temperature, large woody material, lower bank angle,
and width/depth ratio; as well as other aquatic habitat parame-
ters which may be affected by livestock grazing.”121
When an FEIS addresses a planning area on federal lands in
the Northwest affecting threatened steelhead as well as
threatened and endangered plant species, stubble height stan-
dards must typically be greater than six inches in order to protect
critical habitats for threatened, endangered, or sensitive species,
and a six-inch minimum stubble height for areas susceptible to
bank damage.122  Further, an FEIS must disclose and analyze ex-
isting consistency with, and effects of, the alternatives on the
eight PACFISH ecological goals, including maintenance restora-
tion of habitat complexity, water quality, channel integrity and
other biotic and abiotic aspects of watersheds, streams, and habi-
ment plan which establishes fish-habitat conservation areas along rivers and streams
as well as goals for protecting the species in these habitat areas. See  Press Release,
Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., NMFS Releases “PacFish” Biological Opinion Aimed
at Streamlining Pacific Northwest Salmon Protection (Feb. 8, 1995), available at
http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/pr95/feb95/pacfish.html.
118 Nez Perce Tribe v. NOAA Fisheries, No. 04-299-C-EJL, slip op. at 11 (D.
Idaho Sept. 21, 2005).  Similarly, “the lack of anything more than generalized con-
clusions regarding a modeling . . . [and] accounting, or lack thereof, for the sediment
impact from [federal management] activities violates the requirements of NEPA.”
Id.  at 9.  This conclusion is based on the fact that “the lack of a discussion of the
model’s consideration of relevant variables precludes the ability of others to test the
accuracy or reliability of the model.” Id.
119 See STATE SUPERVISOR/DEPUTY STATE SUPERVISOR, supra  note 102, at 26.
120 PACFISH, supra  note 117, app. C, at 4-5; see also id.  app. J, at 3. (containing R
NMFS’s BiOp for PACFISH and listing PACFISH’s Riparian Management
Objectives).
121 See, e.g. , 2001 BIOP, JOHN DAY RIVER BASIN, supra  note 91, at 43. R
122 WARREN P. CLARY & BERT F. WEBSTER, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., MANAGING
GRAZING OF RIPARIAN AREAS IN THE INTERMOUNTAIN REGION, GENERAL TECH-
NICAL REPORT INT-263, at 3 (1989).
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tats.123  Progress toward these goals is necessary to provide con-
sistency with basin-wide efforts, and a consistent analysis aids in
a determination of jeopardy and adverse modification of habi-
tats.124  Issuance of livestock grazing leases, in just about every
case, would trigger the PACFISH mandate to “[m]odify grazing
practices (e.g., accessibility of riparian areas to livestock, length
of grazing season, stocking levels, timing of grazing, etc.) that re-
tard or prevent attainment of [RMOs].”125  Unless so modified,
therefore, and since habitat for salmonids and other aquatic spe-
cies on many federal grazing allotments already substantially vio-
late PACFISH RMOs, any level of continued livestock grazing
affecting riparian areas on such allotments will “retard or pre-
vent” attainment of such RMOs would violate the PACFISH
mandate.“126
The description of “incidental take” in the BiOp also cannot
be overly vague.  In Ariz. Cattlemen’s Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Serv. , the district courts had previously set aside the gov-
ernment’s incidental take statements as arbitrary and capricious
due to insufficient evidence of take.127  The Ninth Circuit found
that such statements must be predicated on a finding of actual
incidental take and clear terms and conditions.128  Moreover, Bi-
Ops must consider baseline and cumulative effects in livestock-
grazing-related consultation.129  The environmental analysis must
123 PACFISH, supra  note 117, app. C, at 3-4. R
124 See id.  app. J, at 15, 18-19.
125 See id. , app. C, at 12.
126 See id. ; see also id.  app. J, at 19-20 (acknowledging that livestock grazing is a
potentially harmful action in riparian areas in the context of a discussion on the
limitations of PACFISH, specifically that the plan “does not provide a decision
framework for determining whether or not potentially harmful land use actions will
assist, retard or prevent attainment of [PACFISH’s RMOs]”).
127 273 F.3d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 2001).
128 Id.  Insufficient descriptions of compliance with standards may also be viola-
tions of the National Forest Management Act.  In Nez Perce Tribe , the court con-
cluded that the forest plan’s provisions, which provided for no measurable increase
in sediment in watersheds found within the planning area, did not meet the forest-
plan standards and violated the National Forest Management Act. See No. 04-299-
C-EJL, slip op. at 19.  The provisions failed because the Forest Service relied on a
computer program database to show compliance with the “no measurable increase”
standard, and the Agency failed to take the requisite hard look at the database pro-
gram under NEPA. See id.
129 Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1207 (D. Or. 2001); Defenders
of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 130 F. Supp. 2d 121, 127-28 (D.D.C. 2001); see also  Pac. Coast
Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 265 F.3d 1028, 1036
(9th Cir. 2001).
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adequately discuss cumulative impacts on aquatic or riparian
habitats, and any discussion of such impacts should include more
than just the impacts of livestock and big-game grazing, distribu-
tion, stocking rates, and economics on private lands.  If it does
not, the FEIS conflicts with the requirement that the government
may not disregard actions on federal lands simply because their
impacts may be relatively minor when compared to other actions
implemented over a broad geographic scope.130
Finally, BiOps cannot rely on uncertain, future, or third-party
mitigation measures.131  For example, in some cases, agency plans
inconsistent with the six-inch stubble height standard in riparian
areas may impact necessary fishery habitat to such an extent that
the impacts eventually rise to the level of an adverse modifica-
tion or takings claim.  Federal rangeland-management plans, for
example, may not implement livestock-grazing seasons without
complying with PACFISH standards for protection of anadro-
mous fish.132  Such plans must also comply with recent precedent
requiring that the consulting agency must not segregate the ele-
ments of the proposed action that the consulting agency deems to
be nondiscretionary, must aggregate rather than compare the ef-
fects of the proposed action, and must adequately consult on
both recovery and survival in the jeopardy determination.133  Fi-
130 See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 265 F.3d at 1037.
131 Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1273
(D. Or. 2003); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 254 F. Supp. 2d
1196, 1213 (D. Or. 2003); see also  Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1388-89 (9th
Cir. 1987).
132 See PACFISH, supra  note 117, app. C, at 3-23. R
133 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Nos. 01-640-RE (Lead
Case), 05-23-RE (Consolidated Cases), 2005 WL 1278878, at *15-29 (D. Or. May 26,
2005) (opinion and order).  This requirement arises out of ESA implementation reg-
ulations, which provide that in formulating its biological opinion and determining
whether an action will jeopardize a species or destroy or adversely modify its critical
habitat, the consulting agency must evaluate the “effects of the action” together with
“cumulative effects” on the listed species. 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.14(g)(3)-(4) (2006).  This
multi-step analysis requires NMFS to consider: a) the direct, indirect, interrelated,
and interdependent effects of the proposed action, see 50 C.F.R. § 402.02; b) the
“environmental baseline,” to which the proposed action will be added, (this baseline
includes “all past and present impacts of all Federal, State, or private actions and
other human activities in the action area; the anticipated impacts of all proposed
Federal projects in the action area that have already undergone formal or early sec-
tion 7 consultation; and the impact of State or private actions which are contempora-
neous with the consultation in progress,” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02); and c) any “future
State or private activities, not involving Federal activities, that are reasonably cer-
tain to occur within the action area of the Federal action subject to consultation,” 50
C.F.R. § 402.02.
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nally, these same factors may be considered in a determination as
to whether a BiOp’s analysis and conclusions with respect to crit-
ical habitat are flawed.134
4. Essential Fish-Habitat Consultation
In 1996, Congress passed the Sustainable Fisheries Act,135
which amended the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act to establish new requirements for Essential
Fish Habitat (EFH) descriptions in federal fishery-management
plans136 and to require federal agencies to consult with NOAA
Fisheries on activities that may adversely affect EFH.137  The
purpose of the Sustainable Fisheries Act, in part, is to:
provide for the preparation and implementation, in accor-
dance with national standards, of fishery management plans
which will achieve and maintain, on a continuing basis, the op-
timum yield from each fishery; . . . establish Regional Fishery
Management Councils to exercise sound judgment in the stew-
ardship of fishery resources through the preparation, monitor-
ing, and revision of such plans under circumstances (A) which
will enable the States, the fishing industry, consumer and envi-
ronmental organizations, and other interested persons to par-
ticipate in, and advise on, the establishment and
administration of such plans, and (B) which take into account
the social and economic needs of the States; [and] promote the
protection of essential fish habitat in the review of projects
conducted under Federal permits, licenses, or other authorities
that affect or have the potential to affect such habitat.138
As a result, compliance with these Acts is an essential compo-
nent of all livestock-grazing actions in riparian areas.  The Sus-
tainable Fisheries Act requires consultation for all actions that
may adversely affect EFH, including actions taking place outside
of such habitat such as upstream and upslope permitting and
funding activities that may have an adverse effect on EFH.139  In
addition, the action agency may not continue with an action af-
fecting designated EFH for chinook salmon unless it is likely
134 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n , Nos. 01-640-RE (Lead Case), 05-23-RE (Consolidated
Cases), 2005 WL 1278878, at *29-34.
135 Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 16 U.S.C. (2006)).
136 See  16 U.S.C. § 1853(a) (2006).
137 See id.  § 1854. “‘Essential Fish Habitat’ means those waters and substrate
necessary to fish for spawning, breeding, feeding, or growth to maturity.”  16 U.S.C.
§ 1802(10).
138 Id. § 1801(b)(4)-(5), (7).
139 See id.  §§ 1855(b)(1)(D)(2), 1802(10).
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“within the range of effects considered in the ESA portion of
[the] consultation . . . [and] is unlikely to adversely affect” the
listed species’ EFH in question.140  When NOAA Fisheries con-
cludes that livestock-grazing actions on federal land may ad-
versely affect proposed designated-EFH for listed species, to
prevent potentially adverse impacts to EFH, it must recommend
conservation measures that will assist the action agency in miti-
gating such impacts.141
Finally, the Sustainable Fisheries Act requires the action
agency to provide a written response to EFH Conservation Rec-
ommendations within thirty days of receipt.142  The final re-
sponse must include a description of measures proposed to avoid,
mitigate, or offset the adverse impacts of the activity.143  If the
response is inconsistent with the EFH Conservation Recommen-
dation, an explanation of the reasons for not implementing them
must be included.144
5. Section 9 Take
Even a federal action that will not jeopardize a listed species or
may go forward with RPAs might “take” some individuals of the
species.  Under the ESA, “take” means “to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct.”145  The U.S. Supreme Court further
interprets “harm” to be broader than direct physical effects, con-
cluding that the term includes adverse modification of habitat.146
The portion of ESA section 9 relevant to grazing issues prohibits
any person from taking any threatened or endangered species
“within the United States or the territorial sea of the United
States.”147
In the context of federally authorized livestock-grazing actions,
the most common impact on listed species occurs from “inciden-
140 See, e.g. , Letter from Donna Darm, Acting Reg’l Adm’r, Nat’l Oceanic and
Atmospheric Admin., to Christina M. Welch, Field Manager, Bureau of Land
Mgmt., 5 (Feb. 16, 2001) (on file with author).
141 16 U.S.C. § 1855(b)(4)(A).
142 Id.  § 1855(b)(4)(B).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19); CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra  note 62, at 4-44. R
146 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697
(1995).
147 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
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tal take.”148  In such cases, the consulting agency may grant an
exemption for the activity in question if the effects are not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or destroy
or adversely modify designated critical habitat, or if the effects
result from an otherwise lawful activity and the impact is inciden-
tal to the purpose of the action.149
Such ESA exemptions apply “[i]f after consultation under sub-
section (a)(2) of this section, the Secretary concludes that the
agency action will not violate such subsection, or offers reasona-
ble and prudent alternatives which the Secretary believes would
not violate such subsection.”150  In the latter case, the consulting
agency may authorize the activity by issuing an incidental take
statement (ITS) specifying: the impact of the take on the listed
species, “reasonable and prudent measures” to minimize the im-
pact, and terms and conditions necessary to implement such
measures.151
The consulting agency, however, may only issue an ITS when
there is evidence that the action will take individuals of the spe-
cies.  In Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Bureau of Land
Management , the Ninth Circuit reinforced that under the ESA,
the action agency has the burden of proving that a listed species
exists in an area in order to justify issuing an ITS and condition-
ing land-use permits based on it.152  In Arizona , the USFWS ar-
gued that “take” under the consultation provisions of section 7
required it to issue an ITS when “harm to a listed species was
‘possible’ or ‘likely’ in the future due to the proposed action,”
instead of having to illustrate that “take has occurred or is rea-
sonably certain to occur” as required under section 9.153  Accord-
148 “Incidental take” means a taking of threatened or endangered species that is
“incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activ-
ity.”  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
149 CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 62, at 4-45; see also  16 U.S.C. R
§ 1536(h).  A taking that is in compliance with the ESA’s exemption requirements is
not considered to be a prohibited taking.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2); Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 170 (1997).
150 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(A).
151 Id.  § 1536(b)(4).  Therefore, even if NOAA Fisheries finds that an action is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species, it often will condition
such a decision upon the action agency’s meeting of certain RPAs and terms and
conditions necessary to protect such species, see e.g ., CONSULTATION HANDBOOK,
supra note 62, at 4-44, and/or it will limit the BiOp to a set period of time, see e.g. ,
2001 BIOP, JOHN DAY RIVER BASIN, supra  note 91, at 1. R
152 273 F.3d 1229, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 2001).
153 Id.  at 1240.
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ing to the USFWS, section 7 authorized it to issue an ITS
“whenever there is any possibility, no matter how small, that a
listed species will be taken.”154
The court, however, found no justification under the ESA for
differential interpretations of the same term, because “the plain
language of the ESA does not dictate that the [USFWS] must
issue an [ITS] irrespective of whether any incidental takings will
occur.”155  Concluding also that, “consistent with the language of
the statute, the regulations only require the issuance of an [ITS]
when the ‘resultant  incidental take of listed species will not vio-
late section 7(a)(2),’”156 and that “[i]f the sole purpose of the
[ITS] is to provide shelter from Section 9 penalties, . . . it would
be nonsensical to require the issuance of [an ITS] when no tak-
ings cognizable under section 9 are to occur.”157  The court fur-
ther reasoned that “speculative evidence” of future take does not
justify imposing conditions on grazing permits and that “it would
be unreasonable for the [USFWS] to impose conditions on other-
wise lawful land use if a take were not reasonably certain to oc-
cur as a result of that activity.”158
The Arizona  decision indicates federal courts are more likely
to apply ESA provisions when there is actual rather than specu-
lative evidence of take, and that, in most cases, it is up to the
federal government rather than private land owners to establish
that a listed species is present in the area in question.159
6. Citizen Suits
The ESA authorizes “any person” to commence a civil suit to
enjoin any private individual or government agency from violat-
ing the Act or its regulations, or to compel the Secretary to apply
the Act’s prohibitions on take found in section 9 or any non-dis-
cretionary act or duty related to listing species under section 4.160
This provision becomes significant when compared to the disad-
154 Id.  at 1240-41.
155 Id.  at 1241-42.
156 Id.  at 1242 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(1)).
157 Id.  (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 26 (1982)).
158 Id. at 1243.
159 Where discretionary federal involvement or control over the action is retained
or authorized by law and the occurrence of specific events threaten the species, the
court found that the appropriate way to deal with prospective harm to a listed spe-
cies was by re-initiating consultation. Id.  at 1243-44.
160 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A)–(C) (2006).
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vantages plaintiffs face when attempting to enforce other federal
environmental statutes that do not contain citizen suit
provisions.161
Even with both the ESA’s substantive provisions and citizen
suit provisions, however, there are still notable limitations on the
ability of plaintiffs to prevail in federal court.  In most cases, the
RPAs and other conclusions reached by a consulting agency, for
example, are merely recommendations, and it is up to the action
agency’s discretion how to proceed once it receives the BiOp.162
In addition, the action agency retains significant discretion in de-
termining how to comply with the Act after the consulting
agency recommendations are made.163
III
THE ESA LAWSUIT
A. Nature of Action
The typical ESA action seeks judicial relief ordering the defen-
dant federal land-management agency to comply with the re-
quirements of the ESA, with respect to the agency’s livestock-
grazing-management actions in the planning area in question and
sometimes specifically on livestock-grazing allotments, within the
area.  The complaint commonly describes the species listed as
threatened or endangered as being found within the planning
area.
B. Jurisdiction and Venue
Courts typically have jurisdiction over federal-agency grazing
actions that arise under the laws of the United States,164 includ-
ing the National Environmental Policy Act,165 the Forest Organic
Act,166 the APA,167 the Declaratory Judgment Act,168 and the
161 See  discussion infra  Part IV.
162 See  Aluminum Co. v. Adm’r, Bonneville Power Admin., 175 F.3d 1156, 1160-
61 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied , 528 U.S. 1138 (2000).
163 Id.  at 1161-62 (holding that Bonneville Power Administration’s adoption of
measures recommended by NOAA Fisheries for avoiding jeopardy to salmon in Co-
lumbia River Basin was supported by adequate foundation, notwithstanding differ-
ence of opinion among experts).
164 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
165 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006).
166 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1782 (2006).
167 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (2006).
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Equal Access to Justice Act.169  But for requested relief to be
proper under the APA and Equal Access to Justice Act, an actual
and justiciable controversy must exist between the parties.170  In
addition, the plaintiff typically provides a statement that the de-
fendant received written notice of the violations alleged in the
complaint more than sixty days prior, in compliance with the
sixty-day notice requirement.171
Finally, an actual controversy must be present between the
parties within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims in the
complaint must have occurred within the judicial district where
the action was filed.172  Plaintiff’s principal offices also must be in
that district in order to establish venue in the particular federal
district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.173
168 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2006).
169 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006).
170 See  28 U.S.C. § 2412; 5 U.S.C. § 701–06 (2006).
171 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2) (2006) provides:
No action may be commenced under subparagraph (1)(A) of this section—
(i) prior to sixty days after written notice of the violation has been
given to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of any such provi-
sion or regulation;
(ii) if the Secretary has commenced action to impose a penalty pursuant
to subsection (a) of this section; or
(iii) if the United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a
criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to redress a
violation of any such provision or regulation.
(B) No action may be commenced under subparagraph (1)(B) of this sec-
tion—
(i) prior to sixty days after written notice has been given to the Secre-
tary setting forth the reasons why an emergency is thought to exist
with respect to an endangered species or a threatened species in the
State concerned; or
(ii) if the Secretary has commenced and is diligently prosecuting action
under section 1535(g)(2)(B)(ii) of this title to determine whether
any such emergency exists.
(C) No action may be commenced under subparagraph (1)(C) of this sec-
tion prior to sixty days after written notice has been given to the Secre-
tary; except that such action may be brought immediately after such
notification in the case of an action under this section respecting an
emergency posing a significant risk to the well-being of any species of
fish or wildlife or plants.
172 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)-(b).
173 See id.  § 1391(c).
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C. Parties
Generally, a person wishing to appeal a federal livestock-graz-
ing decision must have an interest that is adversely affected by
the decision or have otherwise participated in the public com-
ment period for a particular planning action, allotment manage-
ment plan, or other action of the agency.174  Under the informal
policies of most federal land-management agencies, a person
usually becomes an interested party by notifying the applicable
BLM or Forest Service District in writing a desire to be placed on
the mailing list for any documentation related to the allotment in
question.
Participation in the administrative process prior to filing an ap-
peal, however, is not an absolute requirement.175  The basic pur-
pose of such a process “is to allow an administrative agency to
perform functions within its special competence—to make a fac-
tual record, to apply its expertise and to correct its own errors so
as to moot judicial controversies,” rather than serving as a means
of excluding persons from the resolution process.176
Administrative remedies, therefore, must be sought prior to
filing a suit with an understanding of their purpose “and of the
particular administrative scheme involved.”177  Where pursuit of
particular remedies does not serve those purposes, however, the
courts have allowed a number of exceptions.  Such remedies
need not be pursued: if they are inadequate or not efficacious,178
if the appeal would be a futile gesture,179 if irreparable injury
174 See  43 C.F.R. § 4.470(a) (2006); 43 C.F.R. § 4.410(a)-(b); 36 C.F.R. § 215.11
(2006).
175 See, e.g. , White Mountain Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., 598 F.2d 274, 278
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding that the doctrine of exhaustion is not absolute, and that in
circumstances where a party’s argument is based on a determination made after the
administrative process of appeal is complete, it is proper for a court to consider the
issue).
176 See  Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972); see also  Marshall v. Burlington
N. Inc., 595 F.2d 511, 513 (9th Cir. 1979).
177 McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
178 Am. Fed’n of Gov. Employees, Local 1668 v. Dunn, 561 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th
Cir. 1977); Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1081 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
179 Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Costle, 571
F.2d 359, 363 (7th Cir. 1978); see  Pence v. Morton, 391 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 n.3 (D.
Ala. 1975) (finding that total exhaustion was not required when the practical pur-
poses of the exhaustion doctrine had been met), aff’d , 529 F.2d 135, 143 (9th Cir.
1976).
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would result unless immediate review is permitted,180 or if the
administrative proceeding would be void.181
The purpose of restricting appeals before federal courts to
“parties” is achieved in those cases in which the court does not
interfere with the agency’s processes, the agency has had the op-
portunity to correct its mistakes, and the agency has already ap-
plied its expertise, from which the court may now benefit.182  For
example, in Wright v. Inman , a ranch, as a corporate entity, had
previously pursued an administrative appeal and subsequent ju-
dicial review but was dismissed from the case for lack of stand-
ing.183  When the independent owners of the corporation
subsequently entered as individual plaintiffs, the agency argued
that they lacked standing because the owners had not partici-
pated as parties in any previous proceedings.184  The court, how-
ever, concluded that the owners fell under the futility exception,
because they raised issues identical to those addressed in the cor-
poration’s appeal.185
D. Standing
Federal agencies sometimes insist that appellants fail to meet
regulatory standing requirements for appeals of agency actions if
such appellants have not shown how they are adversely affected
by grazing on the particular allotments contested.  Rather than
use of individual allotments, however, challenges to federal live-
stock-grazing actions filed under the ESA to protect listed spe-
cies typically address broader concerns.
In riparian areas, for example, since rivers are often in direct
contact with livestock-grazing allotments, the primary impacts
from federal management of such allotments are on water quality
and quantity, which affects habitat for listed species. Potential
ESA appellants, therefore, typically focus on the use of the river
corridor for fishing, whitewater rafting, hiking, and other pursuits
180 Rhodes v. United States, 574 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing Renegoti-
ation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974)).
181 Winterberger v. Gen. Teamsters, Local Union 162, 558 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir.
1977).
182 See Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation, 792 F.2d
782, 791 (9th Cir. 1986).
183 923 F.Supp. 1295, 1299 (D. Nev. 1996).
184 Id.
185 Id.
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related to use and enjoyment of the river and associated fishery
habitat.
In addition, if the agency’s interpretation of standing were cor-
rect, the vast majority of ESA-related claims regarding authori-
zation of resource extraction in one location that impact
endangered species in another would be excluded.  Scientific
literature supports this idea, providing that the impact to riparian
areas and rivers “diminishes their capacity to provide critical
ecosystem functions, including the cycling and chemical transfor-
mation of nutrients, purification of water, attenuation of floods,
maintenance of stream flows and stream temperatures, recharg-
ing of groundwater, and establishment and maintenance of habi-
tats for fish and wildlife.”186  Conservationists concerned with the
impacts of livestock grazing, therefore, typically emphasize pro-
tection of the ecological conditions of the river environment as a
whole.
As a result, it is important for plaintiffs in ESA cases to assert
that the defendants’ failure or refusal to comply with the ESA
directly affects the plaintiff’s interests.  Where appropriate, plain-
tiffs also should claim that their interests and members have
been, and will continue to be, injured and harmed by a particular
federal agency’s decision to proceed with grazing prior to com-
pleting consultation with NOAA Fisheries and USFWS.  By do-
ing so, plaintiffs are arguing that the BLM has foreclosed those
agencies’ flexibility to recommend, and the BLM’s own ability to
implement reasonable and prudent alternatives to the proposed
action.
E. Temporary Restraining Orders
 and Preliminary Injunctions
ESA plaintiffs often request preliminary injunctive or tempo-
rary restraining order relief in order to forestall the irreparable
harm to protected species that may result if the action agency is
permitted to continue grazing livestock.  The Supreme Court and
the Ninth Circuit both have held that section 7 of the ESA im-
poses “a significant restriction on the court’s equity jurisdic-
tion.”187  The Ninth Circuit explained, “In Congress’ view,
186 J. Boone Kauffman et al., An Ecological Perspective of Riparian and Stream
Restoration in the Western United States , FISHERIES, May 1997, at 13, 13.
187 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) in which the Court held that Congress
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projects that jeopardized the continued existence of endangered
species threatened incalculable harm: accordingly, it decided that
the balance of hardships and the public interest tip heavily in
favor of endangered species.”188
To further its policy of protecting endangered species, Con-
gress established both substantive and procedural requirements
in the ESA.189  The Ninth Circuit stated: If a project is allowed to
proceed without substantial compliance with those procedural
requirements, there can be no assurance that a violation of the
ESA’s substantive provisions will not result.  The latter, of
course, is impermissible.190  Thus, “[g]iven a substantial procedu-
ral violation of the ESA in connection with a federal project, the
remedy must be an injunction of the project pending compliance
with the ESA.”191
1. Relative Harm to the Parties
“In cases involving the ESA, Congress removed from the
courts their traditional equitable discretion in injunction pro-
ceedings of balancing the parties’ competing interests.”192  The
ESA’s language, structure, and history demonstrate “Congress’
determination that the balance of hardships and the public inter-
est tips heavily in favor of protected species.”193
To this end, plaintiffs must claim that if the court does not re-
buke the agency’s alleged disregard for the mandatory require-
ments of ESA section 7, the losses to plaintiff and the public will
be significant and may very well be long-term or irreversible.  In
explicitly had foreclosed the exercise of traditional equitable discretion by courts
faced with a violation of ESA § 7); see also  Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S.
305, 314 (1982) (“The purpose and language of the [ESA] limited the remedies avail-
able to the District Court; only an injunction could vindicate the objectives of the
Act.”).
188 Sierra Club , 816 F.2d at 1383 (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. , 437 U.S. at 187-88,
194-95); see also  Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 782,
795 (9th Cir. 2005) (reaffirming that “‘the test for determining if equitable relief is
appropriate is whether an injunction is necessary to effectuate the congressional pur-
pose behind the statute’”) (quoting Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d
1166, 1177 (9th Cir. 2002)).
189 See Sierra Club , 816 F.2d.  at 1384.
190 Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985).
191 Id.
192 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burlington N. R.R., Inc., 23 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir.
1994) (citing Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 933 (9th Cir. 1988)).
193 Id. ; see also Sierra Club , 816 F.2d at 1384 (holding that plaintiff was entitled to
injunctive relief if agency violated substantive or procedural provisions of the ESA).
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the alternative, the complaint must allege that the relative harm
to the agency is minimal or nonexistent, and that continued im-
plementation of the agency’s grazing decision prior to consulta-
tion or other necessary compliance actions will violate the ESA
and its implementing regulations.
2. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
To survive a motion to dismiss a preliminary injunction or tem-
porary restraining order, plaintiffs must establish that they will
likely succeed on the merits of their case.194  The Ninth Circuit
stated that the purpose of section 7(d) of the ESA is to “ensur[e]
that the status quo will be maintained during the consultation
process.”195  For example, in Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas ,
the District of Idaho had previously enjoined the Forest Service
from turning out livestock in Idaho’s Elk Creek Allotment prior
to completing consultation on the impacts of grazing on spring/
summer Chinook salmon.196  The Forest Service then initiated
consultation and returned to the court with a document entitled
“Section 7(d) Determination for the Elk Creek Allotment,” ar-
guing that section 7(d) gave the agency the authority to deter-
mine whether it could proceed with a proposed action as long as
consultation has been initiated.197  The Forest Service’s “Section
7(d) Determination” concluded that the proposed grazing was
“‘not likely to adversely affect’ the salmon.”198  The court, how-
ever, refused to lift the injunction, determining that “the status
quo necessarily contemplates the absence of action in this partic-
ular case—i.e., disallowing grazing activity.”199
Thus, the Pacific Rivers Council  court concluded that the For-
est Service could not, after consultation had been initiated but
before its completion, proceed to turn out livestock without a
194 See generally  Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
195 Conner v. Buford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1455 n.34 (9th Cir. 1988); see also  Lane
County Audubon Soc’y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290, 294 (9th Cir. 1992) (“In order to
maintain the status quo, section 7(d) forbids ‘irreversible or irretrievable commit-
ment of resources’ during the consultation period.”) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d)
(2006)).
196 Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 936 F. Supp. 738, 741 (D. Id. 1996).
197 Id.  at 741–42.
198 Id . at 742.
199 Id.  at 745 (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 169 (1978) (“Our
responsibility under [the ESA] is to preserve the status quo where endangered spe-
cies are threatened, thereby guaranteeing the legislative or executive branches suffi-
cient opportunity to grapple with the alternatives.”).
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BiOp or concurrence from NOAA Fisheries.200  Importantly, this
decision was reached even though in this case the Forest Service
had determined—albeit rather disingenuously, given the tim-
ing—that its proposed grazing was “not likely to adversely af-
fect” listed salmon.201
The requirement that the Forest Service properly implement
RPAs and terms and conditions is supported by Forest Guardians
v. Johanns , in which the court found that the Forest Service vio-
lated the ESA when it failed to comply with certain guidance
criteria established during the initial formal consultation process
regarding the environmental impact of cattle grazing on national
forest land.202  Specifically, the Forest Service failed to comply
with the agreed-upon criteria governing the monitoring of the
grazing’s impact on endangered and threatened species living in
the Water Canyon Allotment of the Appache-Sitgreaves Na-
tional Forest.203
The court found that section 7 of the ESA prohibited federal
agencies such as the Forest Service from taking discretionary ac-
tions that would “jeopardize the continued existence of any en-
dangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species.”204
The court also determined that the Forest Service’s “decision
whether to take a discretionary action that may jeopardize en-
dangered or threatened species is strictly governed by ESA-man-
dated inter-agency consultation procedures.”205
The guidance criteria in Forest Guardians “consisted of certain
factual conditions which if satisfied, would cause the FWS to
agree that a ‘not likely to adversely affect’ finding would be ap-
propriate.”206  As a result, the necessary agency action was “com-
pulsory because it would allow the Forest Service to make
operational changes if necessary to reflect actual range
conditions.”207
200 Id.  at 748.
201 See id.
202 450 F.3d 455, 457, 464-66 (9th Cir. 2006).
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.  (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir.
1985) (“[T]he strict substantive provisions of the ESA justify more stringent enforce-
ment of its procedural requirements, because the procedural requirements are de-
signed to ensure compliance with the substantive provisions.”).
206 450 F.3d at 458.
207 Id.  at 459.
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Further consultation is required if “the identified action is sub-
sequently modified in a manner that causes an effect to the listed
species or critical habitat that was not considered in the biologi-
cal opinion.”208  In addition, the action agency has the burden of
showing that the action will not adversely affect a listed spe-
cies.209  As a result, the Ninth Circuit has determined that when
an action agency fails to meet terms and conditions of a biologi-
cal opinion the agency must reinitiate consultation.210
3. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm
In order to prevail on a livestock grazing-related injunction or
restraining order request, the plaintiff must also show that the
harm created by the agency’s authorization of such grazing is ir-
reparable, in that it will permit ongoing degradation of public re-
sources and contribute toward jeopardizing the continued
existence of protected species.211  The Supreme Court has con-
cluded that “Congress has made it abundantly clear that the bal-
ance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the
highest of priorities, thereby adopting a policy which it described
as ‘institutionalized caution.’”212  Further, “[i]t is not the respon-
sibility of the plaintiffs to prove, nor the function of the courts to
judge, the effect of a proposed action on an endangered species
when proper procedures have not been followed.”213
4. Whether the Public Interest Favors Granting Immediate
Injunctive Relief
Finally, in grazing-related preliminary injunction and tempo-
rary restraining order situations, plaintiffs must demonstrate that
the public interest favors granting immediate injunctive relief by
208 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(c) (2006).
209 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
210 See  Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that
failing to reinitiate consultation where agreed-upon mitigation efforts were not met
violated the ESA).
211 For a description of the elements for an injunction, see Self-Realization Fel-
lowship Church v. Ananda, 59 F.3d 902, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1995).
212 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). See also Amoco Prod. Co.
v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (“Environmental injury, by its nature,
can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at
least of long duration, i.e. , irreparable.”).
213 Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 765 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting argument that
plaintiff must establish injury or harm to the listed species resulting from implemen-
tation of project).
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showing that they seek compliance with a federal statute and its
implementing regulations controlling the agency’s management
of activities on the public lands, and that injunctive relief would
preserve the status quo with respect to the species and habitat in
question until the agency complies with its procedural duties
under the ESA.214  Therefore, in order to prevent permanent and
irreparable harm to the protected species, “the public interest
tip[s] heavily in favor of endangered species.”215
IV
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Absent citizen-suit provisions such as those provided in sub-
stantive statutes such as the ESA, those wishing to challenge live-
stock-grazing decisions must do so under the federal APA.216  As
is often the case, the APA is used in tandem with the ESA to
ensure that a plaintiff has brought all potential legal tools to bear
in protecting federal riparian areas and rangelands.
The APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong be-
cause of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled
to judicial review thereof.”217  Unlike challenges filed under the
ESA, however, plaintiffs filing grazing-related suits under the
APA must meet strict procedural and public participation criteria
if they ever want to see the inside of a courtroom.  As a result, a
complete understanding of the resolution of federal livestock-
grazing conflicts necessarily includes a discussion of the relation-
ship between the administrative and judicial forums and proce-
dures regarding such disputes.
A. APA Challenges to Livestock-Grazing Decisions
Under Interior Department regulations, a contestable federal
decision begins with the approval or adoption of a resource man-
agement plan, which may be protested by “[a]ny person who par-
ticipated in the planning process and has an interest which is or
214 See  Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burlington N. R.R., Inc., 23 F.3d 1508, 1510-11 (9th
Cir. 1994); Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 933 (9th Cir. 1988);
Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1384 (9th Cir. 1987).
215 Sierra Club , 816 F.2d at 1383 (citing Tenn. Valley Author., 437 U.S. at 187-88,
194-95).
216 ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C. (2006)).
217 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
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may be adversely affected by the approval or amendment of a
resource management plan.”218  A protest may raise only those
issues submitted for the record during the planning process.219
Any protests are submitted to the Director of the BLM, whose
determination is “the final decision of the Department of the
Interior.”220
The Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) has administra-
tive jurisdiction over grazing-permit appeals.221  Except in some
specific matters regarding livestock grazing, any person adversely
affected by the permitting decision of a BLM officer or adminis-
trative law judge (ALJ) must first appeal to the IBLA by filing a
notice of appeal within thirty days of being served with the deci-
sion.222  The substantive portion of the appeal, the “Statement of
Reasons,” must be filed within thirty days of the notice of
appeal.223
In addition, the appellant may file a request for stay of the
agency’s decision within thirty days of the notice of appeal, re-
questing that the BLM halt its decision to authorize livestock
grazing and providing specific reasons for granting the stay.224  If
the agency grants the stay, the decision is rendered inoperative
pending the administrative appeal, and if the stay is not granted,
the aggrieved party may seek recourse in federal court without
further pursuing available administrative remedies.225  If the
agency otherwise renders the decision final, the party may also
seek immediate recourse in federal court without exhausting ad-
ministrative remedies.226
The IBLA process is not always predictable, however, and
there are important limitations on what agency decisions are re-
viewable by the Board.  In most livestock-grazing matters, for ex-
ample, prospective appellants may not appeal to the IBLA but
must first look to an ALJ within the Interior’s Hearings Divi-
218 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-2(a) (2006).
219 Id.
220 Id.  § 1610.5-2(a)-(b).
221 43 C.F.R. § 4.1(b)(3)(i).
222 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.410(a), 4.411(a).
223 43 C.F.R. § 4.412.
224 See  43 C.F.R. § 4.21(b).
225 See id.  § 4.21(c).
226 See id.; see also  Idaho Watersheds Project v. Hahn 307 F.3d 815, 825 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding that when an agency’s regulations do not render a decision inopera-
tive pending appeal, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required).
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sion.227 The IBLA’s “appellate review authority cannot be in-
voked simply because someone may object to something [the]
BLM is doing.”228 At minimum, therefore, any appeal to the
IBLA must include a written “identifiable decision, the appellant
must be a ‘party’ to the case, and the appellant must be ‘ad-
versely affected.’”229
Finally, an appeal of the livestock-grazing portion of a re-
source-management plan is not within the jurisdiction of the
IBLA, because the plans are defined as final decisions within In-
terior.230  Instead, when challenging a resource-management
plan, the parties must file an appeal with an ALJ after livestock-
grazing decisions are actually implemented through specific ac-
tions, such as lease renewals or revisions to Allotment Manage-
ment Plans.231
Any party affected by the ALJ’s decision has the right to ap-
peal further to the IBLA itself.232  A decision of the Director or
an Appeals Board of the Office of Hearings and Appeals is final
and “no further appeal will lie in the Department” from such
decisions.233 In addition,“[a]ny persons adversely affected by a
specific action being proposed to implement some portion of a
resource-management plan or amendment may appeal such ac-
tion pursuant to 43 C.F.R. § 4.400 at the time the action is pro-
posed for implementation.”234
In the context of Forest Service grazing decisions, any person
who participated in the public comment procedures leading up to
the decision235 may appeal236 any project and activity decisions
documented in a Record of Decision or Decision Notice, includ-
ing those which, as a part of the project approval decision, con-
227 The regulation provides “[a]ny . . . person whose interest is adversely affected
by a final . . . decision may appeal . . . to an administrative law judge” by filing his
appeal in the office of the authorized officer “within 30 days after receiving it.”  43
C.F.R. § 4.470(a).
228 Hacienda Del Cerezo, Ltd., 135 I.B.L.A. 277, 279 (1996) (quoting S. Utah Wil-
derness Alliance, 122 I.B.L.A. 17, 20 (1992)).
229 Id. ; see also Mesa Sand & Rock, Inc., 124 I.B.L.A. 243, 245 (1994).
230 See  43 C.F.R. § 4.470.
231 See id.
232 Id. § 4.478(a).
233 Id. § 4.21(d).
234 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-3(b).
235 36 C.F.R. § 215.11 (2006) (defining which decisions are subject to appeal).  The
notice and comment procedures for grazing and other actions are listed in 36 C.F.R.
§ 215.3-6.
236 Id. § 215.13; see also id. § 215.6(a)(3).
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tain a nonsignificant amendment to a National Forest Land and
Resource Management Plan.237  As in the case of the BLM, and
depending upon the circumstances, there are restrictions about
which Forest Service decisions are appealable and which are not.
The appellant must submit a written appeal to the Appeal Decid-
ing Officer within forty-five days of the public notice published
pursuant to the Notice of Decision.238  Such Deciding Officer’s
decision constitutes “the final administrative determination of
the Department of Agriculture.”239
Those Forest Service decisions generally not subject to appeal
include: (1) project or activity decisions included in a Record of
Decision for significant amendment, revision, or approval of a
land and resource-management plan;240 (2) preliminary findings
made during planning and/or analysis processes;241 (3) actions for
which notice and opportunity to comment have been published
and on which no expressions of interest have been received dur-
ing the comment period, and on which the Responsible Official’s
decision does not modify the proposed action;242 and (4) deci-
sions for actions that have been categorically excluded from doc-
umentation in an environmental assessment or Environmental
Impact Statement.243
In addition, “subsequent implementing actions that result from
the initial project decision that was subject to appeal” are not
appealable.244  For example, an initial decision to offer a timber
sale is appealable under this part, yet subsequent implementing
actions to advertise or award such sales are not.245
Those who do not follow these procedures before taking their
case to federal court will face stiff opposition from the agency.
The Forest Service regulations expressly provide that “[i]t is the
position of the Department of Agriculture that any filing for fed-
237 Id. § 215.11(a).
238 Id. § 215.15.  The Notice of Decision is published pursuant to 36 C.F.R.
§ 215.7(b).
239 Id. § 215.18(c).
240 Id. § 215.12(a).  Appeals of these decisions are governed by 36 C.F.R. pt. 217.
241 Id. § 215.12(c).  “Such findings are appealable only upon issuance of a decision
document.” Id.
242 Id.  § 215.12(e).
243 Id.  § 215.12(f).  The criteria for excluding the action in question are found in
U.S. FOREST SERVICE, FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK § 1909.15, at 31.11–31.12
(2006), except as noted in 36 C.F.R. § 215.7(b).
244 36 C.F.R. § 215.12(d).
245 See id.
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eral judicial review of a decision subject to appeal is premature
and inappropriate unless the plaintiff has first sought to invoke
and exhaust the appeal procedures in this part.”246
The APA provides that federal courts must reverse agency ac-
tion that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth-
erwise not in accordance with law.”247  The courts interpret this
standard rather strictly, and in order to prevail, “a contesting
party must show that there is virtually no evidence in the record
to support the agency’s methodology in gathering and evaluating
the data.”248  The Ninth Circuit recently determined that analysis
in relation to grazing cases “must be ‘searching and careful,’ but
‘the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.’”249  In such
cases, an agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious only if the
agency:
[H]as relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.250
Therefore, plaintiffs in most domestic grazing cases face a sub-
stantial burden of proof in illustrating sufficiently specific stan-
dards in the applicable statute against which the court can
measure the policy decisions in question.  The Ninth Circuit, for
example, concluded that the generalized policies and objectives
of the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act did not provide
standards specific enough to allow a narrow judicial review of
U.S. Forest Service determination related to carrying capacity on
grazing allotments.251  Another court held that NEPA requires
only that the procedural and general policy requirements of the
Act have been satisfied in relation to the impacts of livestock
grazing, and FLPMA and the Public Rangelands Improvement
246 Id. § 215.21 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 6912(e) (2006)).
247 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
248 Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 807 n.12 (9th Cir. 1979); for a general dis-
cussion of the case law in this area, see Daniel E. O’Leary, Grazing, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW, OR. ST. B. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.
41-18 to -21. (Donald H. Pyle et al. eds., 2006).
249 Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1448 (9th
Cir. 1996) (citing Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989)).
250 See  O’Leary, supra  note 248, at 41-19 (quoting Sw. Ctr. , 100 F.3d at 1448). R
251 See, e.g. , Perkins , 608 F.2d at 807.
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Act do not require the BLM to limit overgrazing or to take mea-
sures to remedy past degradation of public lands.252
An agency decision is arbitrary and capricious, however, if it is
contrary to the plain language of its own regulations,253 and if the
agency fails to take a “hard look” at the environmental impact of
the decision and proposed actions.254  On the other hand, federal
agencies must conduct a reasonably thorough discussion of the
most significant aspects of the probable environmental conse-
quences of their actions and not conclude that environmental
concerns trump all others.255
B. Final Agency Action
Although many agency decisions potentially impact rangeland
ecosystems and fish and wildlife, only final agency decisions are
subject to review under the APA.256  In the context of the ESA,
an administrative agency action is final if it marks “the consum-
mation of the agency’s decision making process” and is “one by
which rights or obligations have been determined or from which
legal consequences flow.”257
Further, according to NOAA Fisheries regulations, any action
under section 7 of the ESA “means all activities or programs of
any kind authorized, funded or carried out, in whole or in part,
by Federal agencies. . . .  Examples include, but are not limited to
. . . actions directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land,
water, or air .”258 All effects of the action must be considered,
including “the direct and indirect effects of an action on the spe-
cies or critical habitat, together with the effects of other activities
that are interrelated or interdependent with that action.”259
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently found that the
ESA “finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial
decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that
252 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1049, 1054 (D. Nev.
1985).
253 Idaho Watersheds Project v. Hahn, 187 F.3d 1035, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1999) (re-
versing denial of preliminary injunction upon finding that the BLM misinterpreted
the timing requirements of a grazing regulation).
254 Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1988).
255 Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996).
256 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
253 F.3d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001).
257 Id.  at 1142.
258 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2006) (emphasis added).
259 Id.
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inflicts an actual, concrete injury .”260  Many livestock-grazing
leases, permits, and other actions, therefore, meet the finality cri-
teria because “the grazing permit program produces significant
impacts on individual locales,”261 and “[t]he term ‘actions’ refers
not only to actions taken by federal agencies, but also to deci-
sions made by the agencies, such as the decision to grant a li-
cense, which allow another party to take an action affecting the
environment.”262
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a stay under the IBLA
regulations must be enforced when necessary to prevent “unre-
viewed decisions to renew grazing authorizations and at the same
time allow[ ] grazing practices that are known to harm the envi-
ronment.”263  In Idaho Watersheds Project , the court granted a
stay of certain livestock-grazing practices that “the BLM con-
cluded in 1996, [were] responsible for the continued destruction
of riparian habitat.”264  If not, according to the court, “pre 1997
grazing practices could continue for many years while appeals
work their way through the administrative hearing process . . .
[because] BLM regulations establish no time frames or deadlines
for grazing permit appeals to be concluded and administrative
appeals can languish for years without decision.”265
Recognizing the need for finality in domestic grazing decisions
at the administrative level, the Ninth Circuit recently found that
the Forest Service’s use of “Annual Operating Instructions” for
public lands grazing constitutes final agency action for purposes
of judicial review.266  In the initial litigation, the plaintiffs re-
quested that the court suspend grazing in several allotments on
the Malheur National Forest of Central Oregon because of the
agency’s alleged failure to comply with several binding environ-
mental requirements, including the Forest Plan as amended by
PACFISH, INFISH, and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.267
260 Idaho Watersheds Project v. Hahn, 307 F.3d 815, 828 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 144 (1993)) (emphasis added).
261 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 834 (D.D.C. 1974).
262 Id.  (citing Scientists’ Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 481
F.2d 1079, 1088-89 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
263 Idaho Watersheds Project , 307 F.3d at 837.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 979, 982-83 (9th
Cir. 2006).
267 See id.  at 981.
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The district court held that the Annual Operating Instructions
were not final within the meaning of section 10(c) of the APA,268
and dismissed plaintiffs’ lawsuit for lack of subject matter juris-
diction.269  The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case,
concluding that the Forest Service’s action in issuing the Annual
Operating Instructions was “final agency action” under section
10(c) and therefore, plaintiffs’ claims were ripe for judicial
review.270
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Idaho Watersheds Project  court noted the contradictory
language in BLM regulations affecting exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies.271  Department of the  Interior regulations gov-
erning the BLM appeals process provide that:
No decision which at the time of its rendition is subject to ap-
peal to the Director or an Appeals Board shall be considered
final so as to be agency action subject to judicial review under
5 U.S.C. 704, unless a petition for a stay of decision has been
timely filed and the decision being appealed has been made
effective in the manner provided in paragraphs (a)(3) or (b)(4)
of this section or a decision has been made effective pending
appeal pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this section or pursuant
to other pertinent regulation.272
Additional BLM regulations, however, provide that even when
a stay is granted, previously authorized grazing-use will continue
at that level, subject to any relevant provisions of the stay order,
even while the stay is in effect.273  A failure to enforce a stay,
therefore, “has the effect of a multi-year renewal of grazing per-
mits without environmental review and without imposing any
measures to protect the environment while appeals are
pending.”274
D. Ripeness
Potential litigants of livestock-grazing actions must also meet
“ripeness” standards developed by federal courts.  The leading
268 Id.  at 979.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 307 F.3d 815, 826-828 (9th Cir. 2002).
272 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(c) (2006).
273 Id. § 4160.4(b) (2006).
274 Idaho Watersheds Project, 307 F.3d at 827.
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case in this regard is Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club ,
which determined that a complaint filed by conservationists re-
garding a Forest Service land-management plan was not ripe for
judicial review because, by itself, the plan created no legal rights
or obligations, and the plaintiffs could bring their legal challenge
at the time any proposal for logging was approved and before
harvesting could occur.275  To reach its conclusion, the Court con-
sidered: “(1) whether delayed review would cause hardship to
plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial intervention would inappropriately
interfere with further administrative action; and (3) whether
courts would benefit from further factual development of the is-
sues presented.”276
V
ON-THE-GROUND APPLICATION OF THE ESA
A. Sage Grouse
Sage grouse habitat in the vast, scrubby lands of the sages-
teppe ecosystem has undergone an extensive assault over the
past hundred years from land-use practices such as livestock
grazing, agriculture, and resource extraction.277  Sagebrush and
bunchgrass habitats of this ecosystem once dominated, but now
cheatgrass is most prevalent, with little or no sagebrush over-
story, making population recovery difficult.278  As a result, the
general trend of sage grouse populations is significantly
downward,
frequently significantly so. . . .  Close examination of what is
known in [California and Colorado] demonstrates that sage-
grouse populations in both states have markedly decreased
since the 1960’s (and later in at least Colorado).  Sage-grouse
have been extirpated from local areas and even counties in
both states (Siskiyou in California . . . Lake and Summit in
Colorado . . .) and other local populations are barely
persisting.279
275 Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732-36 (1998).
276 Id.  at 733.
277 U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR & U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, FACT SHEET: LOSS OF
SAGEBRUSH ECOSYSTEMS AND DECLINING BIRD POPULATIONS IN THE INTERMOUN-
TAIN WEST: PRIORITY RESEARCH ISSUES AND INFORMATION NEEDS USGS FS-122-
02 (2002), available at  http://sagemap.wr.usgs.gov/docs/fs-loss_of_sagebrush.pdf.
278 Id.
279 CLAIT E. BRAUN, PROFESSIONAL REVIEW OF: CONNELLY, J. W., S. T. KNICK,
M. A. SCHROEDER & S. J. STIVER, CONSERVATION ASSESSMENT OF GREATER
SAGE-GROUSE AND SAGEBRUSH HABITATS, WESTERN ASSOCIATION OF FISH AND
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Under most federal management policies, however, the sage
grouse is grouped with other special-status species, and vague
and limited rules are laid out for their management.280  Due to
the extensive areas and variety of habitats needed to sustain sage
grouse, it is unlikely that current prescribed levels of livestock
grazing under federal range-plans will allow the bird to re-
cover.281  However, a Memorandum of Understanding signed by
the BLM and several federal agencies names the BLM as the
lead party in state and local sage grouse conservation efforts.282
The BLM’s stated sage grouse management goal is to “[s]ustain
or reestablish the integrity of the sagebrush biome to provide the
amount, continuity, and quality of habitat that is necessary to
maintain sustainable populations of sage grouse and other sage-
brush-dependent wildlife species.”283
B. Petition to Protect Sage Grouse
In December 2003, some twenty conservation groups peti-
tioned the USFWS to extend ESA protection to the sage
grouse.284  The groups provided information on threats to the
WILDLIFE AGENCIES, UNPUBLISHED REPORT, CHEYENNE, WYOMING 3 (2004); see
also DAVID S. DOBKIN & JOEL D. SAUDER, HIGH DESERT ECOLOGICAL RESEARCH
INST., SHRUBSTEPPE LANDSCAPES IN JEOPARDY: DISTRIBUTIONS, ABUNDANCES,
AND THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF BIRDS AND SMALL MAMMALS IN THE INTER-
MOUNTAIN WEST 7 (2004).
280 The Department of Interior’s own experts, for example, recommend imple-
menting significant reductions or elimination of livestock grazing in affected sage
grouse areas. See DAVID DOBKIN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MANAGEMENT
AND CONSERVATION OF SAGE GROUSE, DENOMINATIVE SPECIES FOR THE ECOLOGI-
CAL HEALTH OF SHRUBSTEPPE ECOSYSTEMS 18 (1995); see also BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT, ET AL. GREATER SAGE-GROUSE AND SAGEBRUSH-STEPPE ECOSYS-
TEMS MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES 11 (2000) (“Timing and location of livestock turn-
out and trailing should not contribute to livestock concentrations on leks during the
sage-grouse breeding season.”).
281 See DOBKIN & SAUDER, supra note 279, at 17 (“Birds that depend on native R
vegetation for the supporting structure and protective cover of their nests clearly are
jeopardized by the complete loss of native vegetation (e.g., from agricultural conver-
sion).  The effects of livestock grazing, invasion by exotic plant species, and altera-
tion of natural fire regimes can be much less obvious and sometimes synergistic.”).
282 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., Guidance for the Management of Sagebrush Plant
Communities for Sage-Grouse Conservation in  NATIONAL SAGE-GROUSE CONSER-
VATION STRATEGY 2 (2004), available at  http://www.blm.gov/nhp/spotlight/sage_
grouse/docs/Sage-Grouse_Strategy_1_4_1.pdf.
283 Id.
284 Press Release, American Lands Alliance and Twenty Other Conservation Or-
ganizations, Conservation Organizations Petition to List Greater Sage Grouse
Under Endangered Species Act (Dec. 22, 2003) (on file with Journal of Environ-
mental Law and Litigation).
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species that was new from the last listing petition filed in 2002,
claiming the dramatic increase in oil and gas drilling, paired with
the failure to provide common sense protections for the most
sensitive habitats, was destroying sage grouse habitat.285
A coalition of ranchers, miners, oil and gas, and other com-
mercial industries, however, has launched a campaign to keep
the bird off the list, leading the Bush administration to deny the
petition on grounds that “there’s no evidence they are a unique
subspecies of other sage grouse found in the West.”286  Interior
Secretary Norton, speaking at the Western Governors Associa-
tion annual meeting, said that “listing the sage grouse as an en-
dangered species could significantly affect energy production and
grazing.”287  She also said the BLM will require site-specific best-
management practices to reduce the impact to the habitat.288  Ul-
timately, in 2005 the USFWS decided to not list the sage
grouse289 despite an eighty-five percent decline of the species in
some areas.290
The plight of the sage grouse is significant because many are
concerned that its listing could have impacts similar to those of
the spotted owl, which dominated the headlines in the early
1990s and drastically transformed the Northwest logging indus-
try.  A sage grouse listing could affect grazing and most other
extraction activities in the West, with associated economic im-
pacts on 10 million acres in eleven western states.291  The listing
would require the USFWS to take over management from state
biologists and control approval of any activity that could affect
285 Associated Press, Conservation Groups Seek Sage Grouse Protection , CASPER
STAR TRIB. (Wyo.), Dec. 24, 2003, at B1.
286 Associated Press, Petition to List “Eastern” Sage Grouse Rejected , LAS VEGAS
SUN, Jan. 6, 2004, available at  http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/nevada/
2004/jan/06/010610971.html.
287 Deborah Baker, Associated Press, Norton: Sage Grouse Listing Would Hurt
Energy Production , CASPER STAR TRIB. (Wyo.), June 24, 2004, available at  http://
www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2004/06/24/news/wyoming/
ce0cc60799e361f587256ebc005b15ee.txt.
288 Id.
289 Press Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Status Review Completed: Greater
Sage-Grouse Not Warranted for Listing as Endangered or Threatened (Jan. 7, 2005)
(on file with Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation).
290 Ray Ring, Strange Bedfellows Make a Grazing Deal in Idaho , HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Oct. 3, 2005, at 6.
291 See  Hal Clifford, Last Dance for the Sage Grouse? , HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Feb. 4, 2002, at 1.
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sage grouse.292  If the USFWS is ultimately forced to list the sage
grouse, the costs could fall to individuals.  For instance, ranchers
who graze livestock on public land may have to change the tim-
ing and duration of their animals’ use of the range; and if they
cannot graze for long periods of time, they may have to leave
their cattle on private land—which is usually used for growing
hay—or pay a private property owner to pasture their
livestock.293
In a sign of potential future trends in litigation related to sage
grouse, Idaho Federal District Court Judge Winmill halted live-
stock grazing on 800,000 acres of public lands in the BLM’s Jar-
bridge Resource Area.294  The court’s reasoning focused on the
agency’s mishandling of grazing permits for twenty-eight allot-
ments covering 1.7 million acres of land in southern Idaho.295
The Western Watersheds Project claimed that the BLM violated
federal policies, as well as the agency’s own guidelines, when it
increased grazing levels in the area compromising sage grouse
and other wildlife habitat.296
Although the BLM argued that forage production had in-
creased dramatically due to planting of non-native grasses, the
judge agreed with the plaintiffs, finding that the Agency’s own
data showed that grazing was still harming sage grouse and that
the BLM was “like a horse with blinders on” in its management
292 Id.  (noting that federal intervention would alienate state wildlife agencies,
which enjoy greater public trust and resources).
293 In a memo released to the public in April 2004, a coalition of ranchers, miners,
and oil and gas interests advocated:
“Unleash[ing] grass-roots opposition to a listing, thus providing some cover
to the political leadership at (the Interior Department) and throughout the
administration,” . . . “waging a highly coordinated, multi-industry effort
across 11 Western states to make the science-based case for the right listing
decision” by organizing experts who can “scrutinize the science of those
supporting a listing” and engage “political leaders in the West and in Con-
gress to lobby the administration against listing,” . . . approaching the Inte-
rior Department directly if members are rebuffed by the Fish and Wildlife
Service, the agency responsible for sage grouse protection, [and]
“[e]ngag[ing] with USFWS regional directors. . . . If they do not readily
engage, back channel with DOI officials.”
Scott Sonner, The Associated Press, Industry Coalition’s Internal Sage Grouse Memo
Causes Flap , LAS VEGAS SUN, May 6, 2004, available at  http://www.lasvegassun.
com/sunbin/stories/nevada/2004/may/06/050610261.html.
294 W. Watersheds Project v. Kay Lynn Bennett, 392 F.Supp.2d 1217, 1223, 1225
(D. Idaho 2005).
295 See id.  at 1223, 1229.
296 See id.  at 1220-21.
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of grazing in the planning areas.297  As a result, the judge ordered
that livestock in the affected allotments be removed within sev-
eral weeks and not return until an adequate environmental im-
pact statement was completed.298
C. The Columbia River Mainstem Biological Opinion
Although not a livestock grazing case, the ongoing Columbia
River salmon litigation has numerous legal analogies to domestic
grazing and the ESA.  A key decision in the Columbia River liti-
gation occurred after the fall of 2004, when several environmen-
tal and tribal plaintiffs sought review of the 2004 Federal
Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) BiOp.  NOAA Fisheries
prepared the FCRPS BiOp through a reinitiated consultation
with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bonneville Power
Administration, and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (the Action
Agencies) under section 7 of the ESA.299  The 2004 FCRPS BiOp
was intended to supercede the 2000 FCRPS BiOp and the Fed-
eral District Court of Oregon’s prior summary judgment
order.300
The plaintiffs’ second supplemental complaint sought review
of the 2004 FCRPS BiOp, which addressed the effects of the
FCRPS and nineteen Bureau of Reclamation projects in the Co-
lumbia River Basin on ESA-listed salmon and steelhead.301  The
2004 FCRPS BiOp sharply departed from section 7 consultations
on similar proposed FCRPS actions in 1995 and 2000.302  It con-
cluded that the Action Agencies’ Updated Proposed Action for
the FCRPS projects and facilities would not jeopardize the con-
tinued existence of any of the twelve ESA-listed populations of
297 Id.  at 1223.
298 Id.  at 1229.
299 NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES
SERV., REVISED 2004 BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL
COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND 19 U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION
PROJECTS (2004).
300 Id.  at 1-1.  For discussion of the 2000 BiOp and the district court’s summary
judgment order, see Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 254 F. Supp.
2d 1196 (D. Or. 2003).
301 Second Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at *2,
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 2004 WL 3336573 (D. Or. Dec.
30, 2004) (No. 01-00640-RE).
302 See id.
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salmon and steelhead in the Columbia River Basin, nor destroy
or adversely modify their designated critical habitat.303
Instead of ensuring that listed salmon and steelhead would not
be driven extinct by the federal power system, however, the new
BiOp concluded that the proposed operations were lawful if they
would not further accelerate the trend toward extinction.304  The
BiOp also proposed that such non-furtherance of the trend to-
ward extinction could be accomplished by unspecified and cur-
rently unfunded “improvements” to the Columbia River dams in
question.305  Finally, the BiOp did not provide conditions for
management of water rights or tributaries to assist in mitigating
the impacts on listed species caused by the dams.306
In the summer of 2005, U.S. District Court Judge James A.
Redden granted the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion related
to the FCRPS operations.307  Judge Redden ordered summer
“spill” to occur at four federal dams between June 20 and August
31.308  The spill measures were based upon recommendations
made by northwest Indian tribes through the Columbia River In-
ter-Tribal Fish Commission 2005 River Operations Plan.309
Following his summary judgment decision, Judge Redden
“mapped out a detailed strategy for rewriting the federal govern-
ment’s Columbia River Basin hydrosystem salmon-protection
plan that includes step-by-step participation by ‘sovereign enti-
ties’—the states of Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington,
303 Id.
304 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., BIOLOGICAL OPINION, EF-
FECTS OF THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT UPPER JOHN DAY RIVER BASIN
GRAZING PROGRAM FROM 2004 TO 2008, IN THE NORTH FORK, MIDDLE FORK AND
UPPER JOHN DAY RIVER SUBBASINS, OREGON 8-1 to -4 (2004) [hereinafter 2004
BIOP, JOHN DAY RIVER BASIN GRAZING PROGRAM].
305 Id.  at 8-8.
306 See generally 2004 BIOP, JOHN DAY RIVER BASIN GRAZING PROGRAM, supra ,
note 304. R
307 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Nos. 01-640-RE (Lead
Case), 05-23-RE (Consolidated Cases), 2005 WL 1278878, at *22 (D. Or. May 26,
2005).
308 Press Release, Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm’n, Charles Hudson,
Snake River Salmon Get Safest Summer Trip In Years:  Court Ordered Spill at Fed-
eral Dams Creditor for Substantial Survival Increase (Sept. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.critfc.org/text/press/20050912.html.
309 Spilling is the practice of diverting water away from power-generating turbines
and over spillways. Id.
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and treaty tribes.”310  In a moment of foresight illustrating Judge
Redden’s familiarity with the decades-old Columbia River
Salmon litigation, he stated:
The Action Agencies and others will be exposed to liability for
taking listed species under Section 9 of the ESA. . . . In such
an event, the courts would be required to ‘run the river.’  The
Executive, Legislative, and especially the Judicial Branches
abhor such action by the courts.311
The remand order also required that a first quarterly report on
remand progress, which was due in January 2005, include at mini-
mum, “preliminary information from which the court, the parties,
and amici are able to gain some understanding of: (1) the legal
framework NOAA intends to use in its jeopardy analysis; (2) the
nature and scope of any proposed agency action and/or RPA; and
(3) NOAA’s plan for collaboration with the sovereign
entities.”312
The Redden opinion stated that the “many failures in the past
have taught us that the preparation or revision of NOAA’s bio-
logical opinion on remand must not be a secret process with a
disastrous surprise ending.  The parties must confer and collabo-
rate if we are to reach the goal of a valid biological opinion.”313
Finally, the court warned that failure could force the federal gov-
ernment to consider dam breaching: “This remand, like the re-
mand of the 2000 BiOp, requires NOAA and the Action
Agencies to be aware of the possibility of breaching the four
dams on the lower Snake River, if all else fails.”314
The best illustration, however, of the success of the mainstem
BiOp litigation and Judge Redden’s ordered injunctive relief was
that survival levels of migrating juvenile salmon in the lower
Snake River during the summer of 2005 were “the highest re-
corded in recent years.”315  The analysis “found a nearly 74%
survival rate for sub-yearling Fall Chinook compared to rates be-
tween 30-50% in the no-spill summers of 2001-2004.”316
310 Press Release, Columbia Basin Fish & Wildlife News Bulletin, Redden:  Make
BiOp Complaint or Courts Will ‘Run the River,’ (Oct. 7, 2005), available at  http://
www.cbbulletin.com/Archive/10072005/default.aspx.
311 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Nos. 01-640-RE & 05-23-
RE), 2005 WL 2488447, AT *3 (D. Or. Oct. 7, 2005).
312 Id.  at *6.
313 Id. at *3.
314 Id.
315 Press Release, Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm’n, supra  note 308. R
316 Id.
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D. John Day Wild and Scenic River
In the spring of 2002, the BLM implemented its livestock-graz-
ing decision in the John Day Wild and Scenic River Plan by issu-
ing lease renewals for the T. Cole317 and Hartung318  Allotments
located within the river corridor, and for the planning area in
Central Oregon.  Under the ESA, the BLM must provide suffi-
cient in-river conditions for migrating fish to ensure against jeop-
ardy to threatened and endangered mid-Columbia River
steelhead and bull trout, and to minimize, to the maximum ex-
tent practicable, the incidental take of these species by the issu-
ance of livestock-grazing leases within the river corridor.319
Federal agencies may not conclude that specific actions are in-
significant relative to other actions implemented over a broad ge-
ographic scope,320 but the BLM and the federal fish and wildlife
agencies contended that the Plan and renewed leases impacted a
relatively marginal percentage of John Day River.321  Further,
federal agencies generally must account for the cumulative im-
pacts of individual actions such as issuance and renewal of live-
stock-grazing leases.322  As a result, until such time as the BLM
completes consultation for spring chinook salmon, mid-Columbia
River steelhead, and bull trout, it may not renew grazing leases.
NOAA Fisheries provides, for example, based on the BLM’s
conclusion that the effects of the Plan on designated EFH for
chinook salmon are likely “within the range of effects considered
in the ESA portion of this consultation,” and that “the Plan is
unlikely to adversely affect” the spring chinook EFH.323  The
317 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., PRINEVILLE DIST., LAND USE PLAN CONFORM-
ANCE AND NEPA ADEQUACY RE: PROPOSED GRAZING LEASE RENEWAL FOR T.
COLE ALLOTMENT (Sept. 10, 2001) (on file with author).
318 Letter from Christina M. Welch, Field Manager, Bureau of Land Mgmt., to
Harold Shepherd (March 28, 2002) (on file with author).
319 See  16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006).  NOAA Fisheries and USFWS endorsement of
the BLM’s actions, therefore, appears to violate section 9 of the ESA by resulting in
the take of listed species.
320 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 253
F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001).
321 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., JOHN DAY RIVER PROPOSED MANAGEMENT PLAN,
TWO RIVERS, AND JOHN DAY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN AMENDMENTS at 220
(2001); see also  Letter from Christina Welch, Field Manager, Bureau of Land
Mgmt., to Honorable Bruce R. Harris (June 28, 2001) (on file with author).
322 Pac. Coast Fed’n , 253 F.3d at 1145.
323 Letter from Donna Darm, Acting Reg’l Adm’r, Nat’l Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Admin., to Christina M. Welch, Field Manager, Bureau of Land Mgmt. at 5
(Feb. 16, 2001) (on file with author).
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BLM, however, indicates that “these activities will be consulted
upon individually on an as-needed basis, and are not addressed
in the consultation.”324
Further, the NOAA Fisheries analysis did not address water
quantity and quality because the BLM represented that “the Plan
does not authorize specific actions that may affect listed spe-
cies.”325  Issuance of grazing leases, however, is a specific action,
which will directly impact water quality and quantity in the John
Day River, thereby impacting salmon habitat.
Similarly, the 2004 BiOps for the Prineville Bureau of Land
Management Central Oregon Resource Area Grazing and Pre-
scribed Burning Projects in the Upper and Lower John Day
River Basin do not address livestock grazing in the T. Cole and
Hartung allotments.326  In addition, the BiOps’ stubble-height
standards are inconsistent with the recommendations of the
Agency’s own researchers, who provide that greater than six-inch
stubble heights are necessary for critical habitats for threatened,
endangered or sensitive species.327  Experts also recommend a
six-inch minimum stubble height for areas susceptible to bank
damage.328
Further, the BiOps fail to disclose and analyze existing consis-
tency with, and effects of the alternatives on, the eight PACFISH/
INFISH ecological goals, which include maintenance restoration
of habitat complexity, water quality, channel integrity, and other
biotic and abiotic aspects of watersheds, streams, and habitats.329
The NOAA Fisheries BiOp on the interim PACFISH strategy in
January 1995 noted that progress toward these goals is necessary
to ensure restoration and concomitant improvements in fish
habitat, but even if begun at the time PACFISH was adopted,
“the most significant benefits of watershed restoration likely
would not be realized except over a scale of decades to centu-
324 Id.  at 2-3.
325 Id.  at 2.
326 See 2004 BIOP, UPPER JOHN DAY RIVER BASIN GRAZING PROGRAM, supra
note 304; see also NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., BIOLOGICAL OPINION, R
EFFECTS OF THE CENTRAL OREGON RESOURCE AREA GRAZING AND PRESCRIBED
BURNING PROGRAMS FOR 2004-2008, MIDDLE FORK AND LOWER JOHN DAY RIVER
SUBBASIN, OREGON (2004).
327 CLARY & WEBSTER, supra  note 122, at 3. R
328 Id.
329 See, e.g. , PACFISH, supra  note 117, app. C, at 3. R
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ries.”330  Not only, therefore, is PACFISH considered a short-
term strategy,331 but without such analysis, the BLM cannot as-
sert consistency with the PACFISH goals.
It is also clear from available literature that cattle grazing im-
pedes progress toward these PACFISH/INFISH ecological
goals.332  The NOAA Fisheries BiOps for the 2004-2008 live-
stock-grazing seasons on the John Day, therefore, do not comply
with PACFISH standards for protection of anadromous fish or
with recent precedent requiring consultation for the entire ongo-
ing action.  Such precedent provides that the effects of the action
may not be viewed in isolation, the BiOps may not avoid consid-
ering the status of the species and the environmental baseline,
aggregation is required, consideration as a back-drop is not ade-
quate, and recovery is pertinent to an appropriate jeopardy
analysis.333
NOAA Fisheries’ regulations implementing the ESA, as well
as its ESA Section 7 Consultation Handbook, expressly require
that a jeopardy analysis consider the effects of the proposed ac-
tion, combined with the environmental baseline and cumulative
effects in the action area, and all viewed in light of the species’
status.334  The 2000, 2001, and 2004 BiOps for the John Day,
however, permit a “no jeopardy” conclusion without any effec-
tive consideration of the environmental baseline and the status of
the species.335  The ESA does not permit a jeopardy analysis that
deliberately attempts to view the effects of the action in isolation,
divorced from the aggregate context in which the action oc-
curs.336  Nor may NOAA Fisheries and USFWS adopt a new
methodology for analyzing jeopardy inconsistent with its regula-
tions and past practices, without following appropriate rulemak-
330 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
BIOLOGICAL OPINION, IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERIM STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING
ANADROMOUS FISH-PRODUCING WATERSHEDS IN EASTERN OREGON AND WASH-
INGTON, IDAHO AND PORTIONS OF CALIFORNIA 15 (1995).
331 Id.
332 See  W.S. Platts, Livestock Grazing, in INFLUENCES OF FOREST AND RANGE-
LAND MANAGEMENT ON SALMONID FISHES AND THEIR HABITATS, 389-424 (William
R. Meehan ed., 1991).
333 Id.
334 See  50 C.F.R. § 402.43 (2006); see also id.  § 402.14(c)(4), (g)(3)-(4) (2006).
335 See 2001 BIOP, JOHN DAY RIVER BASIN, supra note 91; 2004 BIOP, JOHN DAY R
RIVER BASIN GRAZING PROGRAM, supra  note 304. R
336 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(c)(4),(g)(3-(4) (2006).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\21-2\OEL203.txt unknown Seq: 53 30-APR-07 9:42
2006] The Future of Livestock Grazing 435
ing procedures and without providing a reasoned explanation for
its diversion from past practices.
E. The ESA and Instream Flows On Federal Lands
It is impossible to provide a complete discussion of on-the-
ground effects of litigation in relation to federal lands livestock-
grazing and the ESA without discussing water.  In the arid cli-
mate of the West, domestic grazing would be impossible without
water, resulting in a co-evolution of the legal histories of water
and grazing.  In addition, state water-rights law serves as the
foundation of the livestock industry’s argument that federal lands
grazing should be treated as a property right, and, therefore, may
not be restricted by the application of environmental protection
or other regulations.337
The doctrine of prior appropriation or preemption was being
practiced on the western range prior to the wholesale departure
from traditional land law, which came about with the addition of
section 24 to the Forest Reserve Act of 1890.338  At the heart of
the legal doctrine of prior appropriation is the concept of posses-
sory interest of possessory rights.  In 1879, Chief Justice Stephen
Johnson Field, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Cal-
ifornia, provided the basis of the prior appropriation doctrine by
stating:
In every district which they occupied they framed certain rules
for their government, by which the extent of ground they
could severally hold for mining was designated, their posses-
sory right to such ground secured and enforced, and contests
between them either avoided or determined.  These rules bore
a marked similarity, varying in the several districts only ac-
cording to the extent and character of the mines; distinct pro-
visions being made for different kinds of mining. . . . They all
337 The riparian system of water rights was transferred to the West from England
and the eastern states as the original law of water in the West.  Kenneth D. Freder-
ick, Water Resources: Increasing Demand and Scarce Supplies , in AMERICA’S RE-
NEWABLE RESOURCES, HISTORICAL TRENDS AND CURRENT CHALLENGES 23, 30-31
(Kenneth D. Frederick & Roger A. Sedjo eds., 1991).  The doctrine gave the owners
of the land bordering a stream correlative right to use of the water; this posed major
development problems in the West where the streams were few and their flows were
unreliable. Id.  at 31.  “Even downstream, riparian lands . . . could be deprived of
water by upstream diversions.  Consequently, during the second half of the nine-
teenth century, the western states either supplemented the riparian system of rights
or abandoned it for the doctrine of prior appropriation.” Id.
338 Forest Reserve Act, Ch. 1263, § 24, 26 Stat. 650 (1890) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 55, 61, 471c-d (2006)).
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recognized discovery, followed by appropriation, as the foun-
dation of the possessor’s title, and development by working as
the condition of its retention.  And they were so framed as to
secure to all comers, within practicable limits, absolute equal-
ity of right and privilege in working the mines.  Nothing but
such equality would have been tolerated by the miners, who
were emphatically the law–makers, as respects mining, upon
the public lands in the State.  The first appropriator was every-
where held to have, within certain well-defined limits, a better
right than others to the claims taken up; and in all controver-
sies, except as against the government, he was regarded as the
original owner, from whom title was to be traced.339
During the settlement of the western United States, the doc-
trine of prior appropriation was used to turn the public domain
into private property.  Livestock interests attempted to use water
rights to privatize grazing lands, just as their more successful
counterparts in the farming and mining community had done.340
Gradually, through court decisions and legislative acts, this cus-
tomary practice developed into the most prevalent water law in
the West.
In 1978, as part of the state adjudication of the Rio Mimbres
River located in the Gila National Forest, New Mexico’s chal-
lenge to the United States’ claimed reserved water rights ulti-
mately ended up in the U.S. Supreme Court.341  The Court
concluded that the United States, in setting aside the national
forest from other public lands, reserved the use of such water “as
may be necessary for the purposes for which [the land was] with-
drawn,” but these purposes did not include recreation, aesthetics,
wildlife preservation, or cattle grazing.342  In a five-four decision,
the Court narrowly construed the implied reserved-water-rights
doctrine and determined that a federal land-management agency
may not assert the implied reserved theory of water rights to ob-
tain instream flows for the protection of recreation, fish, and
wildlife.343
The Court concluded that “Congress intended that water
would be reserved only where necessary to preserve the timber
or to secure favorable water flows for private and public uses
339 Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457-58 (1878).
340 Frederick, supra  note 337, at 31. R
341 United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
342 Id.  at 698.
343 Id.  at 715.
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under state law.”344  According to the Court, “[t]his intent is re-
vealed in the purposes for which the national forest system was
created and Congress’ principled deference to state water law in
the Organic Administration Act of 1897 and other legislation.”345
The Court also found that the forest service received no implied
reserved instream flows in New Mexico since the agency failed to
claim water for the primary purposes of maintaining favorable
conditions of water flows and production of timber.346  Further,
the Court stated that the forest service had to protect water
needed for fish, recreation, and wildlife “in the same manner as
any other public or private appropriator.”347
New Mexico  has been widely criticized by water-rights experts
who argue that the Court’s interpretation of the 1891 and 1897
Acts “is arguably wrong because the reservation of water for in-
stream uses is consistent with the original purpose of the
reserves.”348  Noting the “hostility” of Justice Rehnquist to fed-
eral reserved-water-rights, Sally Fairfax and Dan Tarlock con-
clude that the majority’s opinion overreached in an attempt to
resolve issues not before the Court and potentially affected fu-
ture United States’ instream-flow claims.349  Indeed, although the
parties focused on instream claims having an 1897 priority date
for fish, wildlife, and recreation purposes, the Court went out of
its way to discuss those claims having a 1960 priority date.350
The ESA may not always assure instream-flow water for fish
and wildlife species or for other resources not covered by the
Act.  Nevertheless, the Act may, regardless of the New Mexico
opinion, be “the most potent legal tool for reallocating water to
meet instream flow needs on federal lands.”351  Environmental
groups in Arizona and Idaho, for example, have filed lawsuits
alleging that the Forest Service and the BLM failed to consult
with the USFWS to determine the impacts of stream diversions
and related water-transmission facilities used for federal-lands
344 Id.  at 718.
345 Id.
346 Id.  at 724.
347 Id.  at 702.
348 Sally K. Fairfax & A. Dan Tarlock, No Water for the Woods: A Critical Analysis
of United States v. New Mexico , 15 IDAHO L. REV. 509, 511 (1979).
349 Id.  at 526.
350 See, e.g. , New Mexico , 438 U.S. at 704, 713-15.
351 Lois G. Witte, Still No Water For the Woods, Presented at ALI-ABI Federal
Lands Law Conference 17-18 (Oct. 19, 2001), available at  http://www.stream.fs.fed
.us/publications/PDFs/Still_no_water_for_the_woods.pdf.
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livestock grazing and agricultural purposes on aquatic species.352
Similarly, these groups have filed numerous Freedom of Infor-
mation Act requests concerning water-diversion special-use au-
thorizations issued by the Forest Service in Arizona.353
Hoping to weaken the species-protection aspects of the Act,
agricultural interests have responded with their own litigation.
The Okanogan County commissioners in Washington, for exam-
ple, filed suit against NOAA Fisheries, the USFWS, and the For-
est Service under the ESA for curtailing authorized water
diversions on Forest Service lands for the benefit of threatened
and endangered fish species.354  Such pending or threatened liti-
gation has spurred a debate about federal regulatory authority
over private water diversions, and whether it will prove to be the
end of state historic water-allocation systems or strengthen the
multiple uses and public purpose for which federal lands are
intended.
VI
THE FUTURE OF THE ESA
In August 2000, the Forest Service, USFWS, and NOAA Fish-
eries developed a National Memorandum of Agreement regard-
ing the application of programmatic consultation agreements for
Forest Plan Revisions.355  Such agreements and other staff-level
decisions under the Bush administration, however, are somewhat
unreliable in relation to listed species, because government bi-
ologists are often discouraged from attempting to take action to
protect such species.
President Bush, in fact, has listed fewer species for protection
under the ESA than any other president, and only one-tenth as
352 Id.
353 Id.  at 18.
354 Id.  at 18.
355 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., MALHUER, UMATILLA, WILLOWA-WHITMAN NA-
TIONAL FORESTS, BLUE MOUNTAINS FOREST PLAN REVISIONS, FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 2-3 (2005), http://www.fs.fed.us/r6/uma/blue_mtn_planrevision/
documents/2005_06_17_WebsiteQAs.pdf.  Such agreements are designed to assist
the Forest Service in meeting its ESA obligations related to development and imple-
mentation of forest-wide management plans including: (1) highlighting the purpose
of consultation regarding forest plan revision; (2) identifying the scope of the consul-
tation analysis; (3) stressing early and ongoing coordination; (4) establishing the con-
sultation timeframes; and (5) establishing a consultation team and outlining a
dispute-resolution process. Id.  at 3.
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many species as his father.356  Further, although the USFWS says
it needs $120 million to list all species needing protection, the
Bush budget proposed only $12 million.357
In the end, federal agencies are consistently and successfully
sued by environmentalists who charge them with neglecting their
ESA responsibilities.  By picking a fight with environmentalists,
therefore, the administration likely has increased the number of
court cases and other conflicts over the Act.  Moreover, reacting
to the number of successful court cases under the Act, Congress
introduced another ESA-reform bill in summer 2005.358
Although the 1973 ESA is a crucial tool for protecting the
West’s environment, the House approved a proposal from Chair-
man of the House Resources Committee Rep. Richard Pombo
(R-Tracy, Cal.) to revise many of the Act’s key provisions by a
vote of 229 to 193.359  The proposal prohibited the government
from declaring “critical habitat” refuges for endangered species
and providing federal compensation to property owners if the
law reduces the value of their land.360  The bill also would have
imposed strict data and record-keeping requirements for listing
decisions and given local political appointees more power in de-
ciding how various animals and plants are protected.361  Finally,
the bill would have weakened the requirement for protecting
“critical habitat” and required more “peer review” by scientists
outside the agencies.362  Because industry can afford to hire an
overwhelming number of “outside scientists,” agency biologists
would have been completely overwhelmed by this change.363
While the White House indicated its support for the bill,364 the
legislation faced opposition in the Senate, and the bill’s momen-
356 Craig Welch, Bush Switches Nation’s Tack on Protecting Species , SEATTLE
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at A1.
357 Id.
358 Farquhar, supra  note 19. R
359 Press Release, Action Network, House Approves Bill Gutting Endangered
Species Act, http://actionnetwork.org/SierraClubNJ/notice-description.tcl?news
letter_id=3637861 (last visited Feb. 9, 2007).
360 Farquhar, supra  note 19. R
361 See  Matt Weiser, Will the Real Mr. Pombo Please Stand Up? , HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, July 25, 2005, at 8.
362 Where Do We Go From Here? Taking the West Forward, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Dec. 6, 2004, at 6.
363 Id.
364 Associated Press, House Passes Bill that Would Revise Endangered Species
Act , WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at A2.
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tum ultimately waned.365  Senator Pombo’s alleged relationship
with lobbyist Jack Abramoff and his other political troubles on
the hill,366 however, hampered progress of the ESA bill.  Instead
of focusing on carrying Pombo’s win to the Senate, key GOP sen-
ators raised serious doubts about elements of the revision.367
Billy Frank Jr., a thoughtful member of the Nisqually Tribe and a
national leader on Indian and environmental issues, helped to
steer the Senate in the right direction during deliberations on the
bill when he testified in October of 2005 before the Senate Sub-
committee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Water.  Frank, Chairman of
the Northwest Indian Fisheries, said:
The goals and objectives of the Endangered Species Act of
1973 are more essential today than they have ever been.  It has
helped return the mighty [bald] eagle and the gray whale from
the brink of extinction.  It has helped bring attention to the
plight of the salmon, and it has helped bring some badly
needed funding to the effort to turn the tide on salmon
decline.368
Ironically, therefore, the assaults on the ESA statutes could
ultimately backfire because of the ruling parties’ failure to ac-
count for the durability of federal environmental laws that pro-
tect our rangelands, as well as the winds of public opinion.
Indeed, at the time of this writing, due in part to the Bush admin-
istration’s low popularity in public opinion polls and the public
faith in laws like the ESA and NEPA, the Pombo efforts to
change them were floundering.369  Those difficulties were re-
cently illustrated by a report from twenty-three experts ap-
pointed by six U.S. Senators and convened by the nonprofit
Keyston Center.370
Comprised of environmentalists, land owners, academics, at-
torneys, timber companies, and home builders, the experts
agreed that the Act could do a better job of protecting wildlife
365 See  Tony Davis, ESA Talks End in Stalemate , HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Mar. 20,
2006, at 3.
366 Pombo, known for his unusually vigorous support of extraction interests and
big business even in today’s Congress, steadily lost support for his efforts to eviscer-
ate several of the major federal environmental laws. See  Weiser, supra  note 361. R
367 See  Betinna Boxall, Foe of Endangered Species Act on Defensive Over
Abramoff , L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2006, at 1.
368 John Dodge, Species Act Backers Pin Hopes on Senate , OLYMPIAN, Oct. 7,
2005, at 1A.
369 Id.
370 Davis, supra  note 365. R
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habitat.371  The group, however, could not reach consensus re-
garding changing the waiver of the ESA’s key regulatory require-
ments,372 including how to replace the current critical-habitat
standard and strategy for preventing harm to species recovery.373
In the end, the public may determine that the financial and eco-
nomic cost of activities which threaten listed species, including
livestock grazing, is not worth the expense and push for removal
of grazing from public lands.
VII
CONCLUSION
The jury is still out both legally and scientifically as to whether
livestock-grazing management is compatible with riparian areas
on lands managed by the Forest Service and the BLM.  The ef-
forts of conservationists and others to bring these problems to
light through litigation have been limited thus far by complex
and sometimes confusing administrative and judicial processes,
as well as deference to agency decision-making in these forums.
Nevertheless, grazing in such areas often conflicts with the
ESA’s requirement that federal agencies “utilize their authorities
in furtherance of the purposes of [the Act] by carrying out pro-
grams for the conservation of endangered species and threatened
species.”374  In addition, such actions are frequently contrary to
the standards provided by related federal laws and regulations
established to protect streamside ecosystems and their associated
values.
Many advocates for public-lands-grazing reform have con-
cluded that the only way to restore sensitive rangelands is to
eliminate public-lands grazing once and for all.375  Such thinking
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 Id. ; see also  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(8) (2006).
374 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).
375 This thinking owes its beginnings to the work of the late Harold Winegar, a
career fish and wildlife biologist for the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife.
See  Bill Marlet, Oregon’s “Father of Riparian Protection” Harold Winegar Passes
Away, OR. NATURAL DESERT ASS’N, http://www.onda.org/aboutus/HaroldWinegar
InMemoriam.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).  His pioneering work on Camp Creek
near Prineville, Oregon, in the 1960s converted the creek from a dry, unsightly gully
into a permanently flowing stream. See  Denzel Fergusen, 2nd Annual Desert Con-
servation Award Address at Desert Conference, Malheur Field Station (Apr. 1995),
available at  http://www.onda.org/aboutus/DesertConfWinegarIntro.html.  Winegar’s
work brought stunning increases of plants and animals to Camp Creek, including
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is gaining momentum as new scientific information emerges, and
public attitudes toward water quality and species protection be-
gins to change.  The appearance of innovative proposals for re-
moving livestock from public rangelands and recent successes
illustrate this momentum shift.376  Ultimately, criticism of the
ESA and recent congressional efforts to change the Act are due
to its stunning success rate in preventing hundreds of species
from going extinct.
Some advocate that the ESA will inevitably succeed, and the
impact of proposed changes to the Act may be limited by sup-
many riparian species such as sedges, willows, rushes, beaver, and waterfowl. See id.
“Sediment that onced washed into a downstream reservoir also was deposited
among root systems streamside and caused the stream to become narrower, deeper,
and cooler.” Id.
376 Recent successes include the Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and
Protection Act passed and signed into law by President Clinton in 2000, which re-
sulted from months of intense negotiations between Oregon’s Governor, the state’s
congressional delegation, public-land managers, ranchers, and conservationists.  The
Act established about 175,000 acres of wilderness, almost 100,000 acres of which is
specifically designated as cow-free, making the Steens the first wilderness area in
history having such status. Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protec-
tion Act of 2000, 16 U.S.C. §§ 460nnn-460nnn-122 (2006).
In addition, when livestock are removed from priarie ecosystems the improve-
ments are remarkable, as illustrated by the recent trend at the Hart Mountain Na-
tional Antelope Refuge in central Oregon.  Kathie Durbin, A Revival on Hart
Mountain , HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 10, 2003, at 5.  After a 1994 management
plan revealed that cattle had trashed springs, trampled stream banks, contaminated
creeks, and destroyed aspen groves, refuge manager Barry Reiswig evicted four
long-time ranchers who held grazing permits on the Refuge. Id.
As a result of Reiswig’s efforts, in 2003 sage grouse counts were at an all-time
high.  Migratory birds absent from the refuge for decades had returned.  Forbs,
which are essential food for pronghorn antelope, had increased 300% in some loca-
tions.  And the survival rate for pronghorn fawns in 2003 was the highest since the
founding of the refuge in 1936. Id. Finally, conservation groups have joined to-
gether to make an ambitious proposal to bring an immediate end to the negative
impacts of livestock grazing on every watershed on public lands in the West. See,
e.g. , National Public Lands Grazing Campaign, available at  http://www.publicland
ranching.org/.
The permit buy-out proposal presents a rare opportunity to appease a broad spec-
trum of interest groups in the public livestock-grazing debate, including ranchers
who could volunteer for the program and would be paid almost triple the market
value per Animal Unit Month of federal grazing permits.  As a result, permit buy-
outs may be especially valuable for ranchers who wish to keep their private land
while receiving a one-time payment.  Fiscal conservatives in Congress should also
appreciate the proposal, which would have an annual net cost of $500 million and a
payback period of about six years, if all public-lands grazing permits were retired.
Id.  In addition, the permanent elimination of federal administrative costs of public
lands in the west would provide cumulative and ongoing savings after the initial six-
year payback period. Id.
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porting the more amicable reforms promoted by property-rights
proponents.377  These include tweaking one aspect of the law that
many see as unfair: it applies not only to federal land, but also to
private landowners.  And over the years, protecting endangered
species and habitat has cost landowners many millions of dollars
by limiting development and reducing farm and ranch produc-
tion.  Some environmentalists acknowledge that if society wants
to protect species and habitat on private land, the taxpayers
should do more to pay for it.  There have been some attempts to
reform the law.  Changes made during the Clinton administra-
tion, for example, allow landowners some flexibility if they par-
ticipate in “habitat conservation plans” and obtain permits for
impacts on endangered species.  However, so far, Congress has
failed to provide significant cash to landowners.378  Especially for
the livestock industry, however, such changes would shift the
burden of the ESA’s impact on reduced production from private
property holders to taxpayers.  Yet, in the context of livestock
grazing, such reformists overlook taxpayers who are already pay-
ing the bills.379  Calls for reform of the ESA may instead add fuel
to the arguments of those calling for removal of livestock from
the public altogether.
In either case, federal agencies clearly may use their existing
authority and management discretion to give the long-term
health of public rangelands and riparian areas the highest prior-
ity and to adapt management, budget, and personnel priorities
accordingly.  Further, federal land managers, administrative bod-
ies, and federal courts should recognize the numerous inherent
impediments to meeting objectives and obtaining results when
considering environmental laws and account for them in deci-
sion-making.
377 Where Do We Go From Here?  Taking the West Forward, supra  note 362. R
378 Id.
379 In 2003, for instance, while the BLM spent $50 million on issuing permits, de-
veloping grazing-management plans, monitoring range conditions, and other admin-
istrative costs, permittees paid the Agency only about $12 million.  April Reese,
Calling it Quits , HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 4, 2005, at 10; see also KAREN MOSKO-
WITZ & CHUCK ROMANIELLO, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,  ASSESSING THE
FULL COST OF THE FEDERAL GRAZING PROGRAM 4 (2002).  Federal grazing fees are
notoriously low; ranchers pay just $1.79 per Animal Unit Month in such fees, far
below the $5 to $15 per Animal Unit Month for grazing state or private lands. Id.
Therefore, the grazing program costs the federal government about $124 million
annually, largely because attempts to increase grazing-permit fees have failed re-
peatedly under the weight of intense industry opposition when all of the agencies are
included. Id.
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In a speech to BLM employees in March 2000, then-Secretary
of the Interior Bruce Babbitt outlined the agency’s future:
[T]he BLM faces a choice.  It can become the greatest modern
American land management agency, the one that sets the stan-
dard for protecting landscapes, applying evolving knowledge
and social standards, and brings people together to live in har-
mony with the land.  Acting with public and private partners,
the BLM can be the paradigm of the Interior Department’s
150th anniversary motto: Guardians of the past, stewards of
the future.
Or it can become a relic, a historical artifact, its most desirable
lands carved up and parceled out to other land management
agencies, with the remainder destined for the auction block of
divestiture.380
380 Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Speech at BLM Interac-
tive Town Hall Meeting (Feb. 24, 2000).
